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INTRODUCTION
Our common law history and constitutional heritage mandate
public criminal trials. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused
the right to a public trial,' and the First Amendment protects the
media's role as the people's monitor of the government.2 The Sixth
Amendment also guarantees the accused the right to a trial before an
impartial jury.
3
Prior to the Norman Conquest, criminal cases in England were
brought before "moots" and attended by the freemen of the town. A
moot refers to the local or county court4 and the freemen acted as
the jurors.' After the Norman Conquest, criminal trials remained
open even though the freemen's attendance no longer was compulso-
ry.6 According to ChiefJustice Burger, the function of such openness
is to reassure the public that fair procedures are followed, but it also
serves the "prophylactic purpose [of] providing an outlet for
community concern, hostility and emotion."7 These overlapping
provisions set the stage for a clash of constitutional proportions.8
1. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed ...." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
2. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states: "Congress shall make
no law.. . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.. .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 565 (1980).
5. See id. at 565-75.
6. Seeid.
7. 1l at 571.
8. The framers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were aware of the potential clash
between the First and Sixth Amendments. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 547
(1976) ("[I] t is inconceivable that the authors of the Constitution were unaware of the potential
conflicts between the right to an unbiased jury and the guarantee of freedom of the press.").
The lawyers who helped write the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were familiar with the
episode in which John Adams defended British soldiers charged with homicide for firing on a
crowd of Boston demonstrators. This situation highlighted the clash between the adversary
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Media coverage of criminal trials has expanded dramatically in the
past thirty years,9 giving the public insight and information about
specific trials in finely-tuned detail. 10 The press' enhanced participa-
tion in the criminal trial process has resulted in an increased number
of appeals based on claims of unfair trials due to media-created juror
bias."
Rapid technological advancement, enhanced public expectations,
and the institutional growth of the media have created another
commonplace phenomenon, namely, the trial of national notoriety.2
Satellites, mobile broadcasting equipment, cable television, and other
new technologies have led to an explosion in coverage of the criminal
justice system. The popularity of CNN, the intense interest in the OJ.
Simpson trial, and the demand for shows such as Court TV and Hard
Copy demonstrate the public's insatiable curiosity. Since the 1960s
when the press began covering the civil rights demonstrations and the
Vietnam War protests, the public's expectations about news coverage
have heightened. In a high profile trial, no county escapes media
system and the inflamed passion of the public. See id. In addition, in 1786, Thomas Jefferson
wrote about press attacks onJohnJay, and stated, "'[In truth it is afflicting that a man who has
passed his life in serving the public.., should [be arraigned] in a newspaper. It is however an
evil for which there is no remedy. . . .'" Id. (quoting 9 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 239 (.
boyd ed. 1954)). The framers declined, however, to assign priorities between the two
amendments. See Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 561 (refusing to assign priority to either First
or Sixth Amendment because authors of Constitution understood potential conflicts between
amendments and still were unable or unwilling to resolve them).
9. See Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., The Media, Attorneys, and Fair Criminal Trials, 4 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 61, 61 (1995) (noting that advent of sophisticated technology enables media to
report contemporaneously on criminal investigations and trials); Eileen A. Minnefor, Lookingfor
Fair Trials in the Information Age: The Need for More Stringent Gag Orders Against Trial Participants,
30 U.S.F. L. REV. 95, 96 (1995) (addressing increased presence of media in criminal trials);
Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who is an Impartial Juror in an Age of Mass Media?, 40 AM. U.
L. REV. 631, 635 (1991) (acknowledging proliferation of media covering criminal trials).
Some examples of criminal trials in which there was increased media coverage include the
trials of Erik and Lyle Menendez for murdering their parents, see Alan Abrahamson, Lyle
Menendez Case Ends in a Mistrial L.A. TIMES,Jan. 29,1994, available in 1994 WL 2129087; the trial
of Lorena Bobbitt for cutting off her husband's penis with a kitchen knife, see Strong Reactions
to Bobbitt Verdict, HOUSTON POST, Jan. 22, 1994, at Al; and the murder trial of O.J. Simpson, see
Adam Pertman, "Not Guilty": Simpson Free After Acquitta BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 4, 1995, at 1.
10. See Alberto Bernabe-Riefkohl, Prior Restraints on the Media and the Right to a Fair Triak
A Proposal for a New Standard, 84 KY. LJ. 259, 259-60 (1995) (discussing detailed reporting of
criminal trials by media); Brian V. Breheny & Elizabeth M. Kelly, Note, Maintaining Impartiality:
Does Media Coverage of Trials Need to be Curtailed? 10 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 371, 371
(1995) (addressing barrage of information presented by media covering criminal trials); Robert
S. Stephen, Note, Prejudicial Publicity Surrounding a Criminal Triak What a Trial Court Can Do to
Ensure a Fair Trial in the Face of a "Media Circus," 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1063, 1066 n.ll (1992)
(citing well-publicized criminal trials involving Marion Barry, William Kennedy Smith, and Mike
Tyson).
11. See Minow & Cate, supra note 9, at 636 & n.22 (asserting that national media carried
reports of more than 3100 claims during 1980s).
12. See id.
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coverage; publicity saturates the nation before the trial begins. 3
The nature of such notorious trials is such that the most effective
technique available to eliminate the effects of pretrial publicity-the
change of venue-is ineffective as a remedy.1 4 This Article explores
the effects of pretrial publicity in criminal cases of national notoriety
and recommends a remedy for the "remediless wrong" of prejudicial
publicity in such cases.
Historically, trial judges have had wide discretion in their manage-
ment of pretrial publicity. Accordingly, appellate courts currently
give trial judges the greatest benefit of the doubt when defendants
appeal their convictions claiming Sixth Amendment or Fourteenth
Amendment16 due process violations.1  The presumption is that
13. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (examining pervasive role of media in criminal
trials).
14. See Minow & Cate, supra note 9, at 647 (describing why change of venue is ineffective
remedy); Mark R. Stabile, Free Press-Fair Trial: Can They Be Reconciled in a Highly Publicized
Criminal Case?, 79 GEO. LJ. 337, 344 (1990) (criticizing efficacy of venue change as remedy for
pretrial publicity). Courts also attempt to remedy the effects of pretrial publicity through voir
dire of the venire. Judge Takasugi's control overJohn DeLorean's trial for drug charges is a
good example. In that case, all the parties agreed that pretrial publicity would deny DeLorean
a fair trial. See Robert M. Takasugi, Jury Selection in a High-Profile Case: United States v.
DeLorean, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 837, 838 (1991). After granting a continuance to allow media
coverage to subside, Judge Takasugi held a conference with representatives of the media to
establish rules of courtroom decorum. See id. The court then called eight panels of 35
prospective jurors each of whom was pre-screened for availability for a long trial. See id. at 839.
The prospective jurors were given a questionnaire aimed at ascertaining media exposure. The
court then gave additional peremptory challenges to each party. See id. Each side conducted
voir dire on each prospective juror's exposure to media, and on their present state of mind
resulting from the exposure. See id. Finally, during the trial the court frequently admonished
the jurors to avoid news relating to the trial. See id.
15. In one early case, the Supreme Court stated:
[A] suitable inquiry is permissible ... to ascertain whether the juror ha[s any] bias,
opinion, or prejudice that would affect or control the fair determination by him of the
issues to be tried. That inquiry is conducted under the supervision of the court, and
a great deal must, of necessity, be left to its sound discretion. This is the rule in civil
cases, and the same rule must be applied in criminal cases.
Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 413 (1895); see also Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451
U.S. 182, 182 (1981) ("Because the obligation to impanel an impartial jury lies in the first
instance with the trial judge, and because he must rely largely on his immediate perceptions,
federaljudges have been accorded ample discretion in determining how best to conduct the voir
dire."); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966) (assertingjudicial control over reporters'
presence in courtrooms); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312 (1959) (observing that
trial judge has broad discretion in ruling on prejudice resulting from pretrial publicity (citing
Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 251 (1910))).
16. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: "[N]orshallany
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S.
CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1. The right to a jury trial was applied to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148
(1968).
17. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 (1984) (holding that trial court's finding of
juror impartiality may "be overturned only for 'manifest error'" (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.
717, 723 (1961))); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910); Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131
(1887); Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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juries are impartial' and that trials are fair absent proof of preju-
dice.' 9
The United States Supreme Court currently uses a "totality of the
circumstances" test to assess claims of prejudicial pretrial publicity.2"
Under this test, the Court examines the atmosphere of the trial and
the voir dire transcript, as well as other "indicia of impartiality"2 to
determine if the defendant did indeed have a fair trial.22 In recent
years the Court has appeared less willing to acknowledge juror bias,25
deferring instead to trial judges' factual findings ofjuror impartiali-
ty.
24
In addition, the Court recently held that there is no constitutional
requirement that a trial judge allow a defendant to question the
venire on the content of pretrial publicity to which the potential
jurors have been exposed. 25 Because juror challenges are based on
the possibility of juror bias, this ruling has the effect of limiting a
defendant's ability to measure the actual bias a juror might have. 6
A defendant must take at face value a juror's claim that she has no
preconceived opinions about either the defendant's guilt or the
outcome of the trial.27
18. See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975) (assuming unbiased jury based on
jurors' professions of impartiality); Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723 (articulating presumption of juror
impartiality ifjuror can render verdict based solely on evidence presented in court and not on
pretrial notion of guilt or innocence); see also Alfredo Garcia, Clash of the Titans: The Diffzcult
Reconciliation of a Fair Trial and a Free Press in Modem American Society, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REv.
1107, 1123-24 (1992) (describing great burden of proof placed on defendants when attempting
to prove juror bias, in part because ofjurors' inability to recognize prejudice or unwillingness
to admit it).
19. See Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723 (suggesting that juror impartiality is presumed unless
challenger demonstrates prejudice (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 157 (1878)));
see also Garcia, supra note 18, at 1120-25 (tracing evolution of "presumed prejudice" standard,
whereby prejudice is presumed only in extreme situations when media circus saturates
community and taints potential jury pool);Judge Peter D. O'Connell, Pretrial Publicity, Change
of Venue, Public Opinion Polls-A Theory of Procedural Justice, 65 U. DET. L. REv. 169, 170 (1988)
(asserting that courts presume prejudice only in rare instances in which massive pretrial publicity
renders fair trial impossible).
20. See Murphy, 421 U.S. at 799.
21. Id. at 802.
22. See id. at 799-802.
23. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 (1984) (according special deference to trial
court's determination ofjuror impartiality).
24. See id. (applying statutory presumption of correctness to trial court finding of juror
impartiality).
25. See Mu'min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 425-26, 431-32 (1991).
26. See Garcia, supra note 18, at 1129-30 (likening search for impartial jury to game of
chance in wake of Mu'min holding that failure to ask content-based questions about type of
publicity to which potentialjurors were exposed does not impinge on defendant's guarantee of
fair trial); Stephen, supra note 10, at 1088 nn.160 & 165 (stating that Mu'min decision does not
require exhaustive voir dire, even though such examination could reveal juror bias).
27. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (assuming juror impartiality absent
contrary proof).
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Such a standardless approach to pretrial publicity is problematic
because it creates deference by a court to a point of neglect of a
serious and growing problem. The absence of a rule of law designed
to test trial judges' ability to nullify the prejudicial effects of publicity
in notorious trials, combined with the evisceration of the defendant's
ability to ascertain effectively the extent of juror bias, eliminates
meaningful review. As a result, this approach creates an underlying
doubt about the actual fairness of such trials.
2 8
A notorious national trial is one in which there is pervasive and
continuous national media treatment in newspapers, magazines, radio,
and television for the duration of the investigatory and pretrial
proceedings." This Article identifies four kinds of trials that attract
media and national attention to such an extent that they become
nationally notorious: (1) "tabloid-type" cases typically involving
unusually sordid facts appealing to the nation's voyeuristic tendencies,
such as the Pamela Smart murder trial; ° (2) cases in which the
nature of the crime is so heinous or shocking that the nation's media
follow it closely, such as Charles Manson's murder trial,3 ' Jeffrey
Dahmer's murder trial,"2 and the Oklahoma City Federal Center
bombing;-3 (3) cases in which the defendants are celebrities, such as
O.J. Simpson's double-murder trial; 4 and (4) cases in which the
28. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1178-79
(1989) (criticizing standards-based "totality of the circumstances" approaches to legal issues as
disregarding need for uniformity in law).
29. See Stephen, supra note 10, at 1066 (defining notorious and well-publicized criminal
trials as those involving well-known defendant or bizarre set of circumstances or both).
30. See State v. Smart, 622 A.2d 1197, 1200 (N.H. 1993) (reporting conspiracy and murder
trial of New Hampshire woman convicted of persuading teen-aged lover to kill husband).
31. See People v. Manson, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265, 274 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1976) (reporting
conspiracy and murder trial for gruesome Tate-LaBianca killings).
32. In 1991, Jeffrey Dahmer confessed to murdering and dismembering up to 16 young
men in the Milwaukee, Wisconsin area. See Grisly Details Emerge of Murder and Mutilation, ST.
Louis PosT-DIspATcH, July 25, 1991, at 1A,; Debbie Howlett, Nightmare in Milwaukee; Up to 15
People Slain and Dismembered, USA TODAYJuly 24, 1991, at 3A; Edward Walsh, Milwaukee Man Said
to Admit 11 Killings, WASH. PoST,July 25, 1991, atAl. Dahmer's attorneys claimed prior to jury
selection that the heavy pretrial publicity in the Milwaukee area would make it difficult to seat
a jury. See Dahmer Trial Will Be Live on Local TV Cable System, CAP. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1992, at 3A;
JurosDrawnfrom Extra-Large Pool, USATODAYJan. 27, 1992, at3A. Because Dahmer plead guilty
to 15 counts of first-degree intentional homicide, his trial dealt solely with the issue of insanity.
See Dahmer Examinations to Be Sealed Before Tial UPI, Jan. 3, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Omni File.
33. On April 19, 1995, suspected Oklahoma City bombers Timothy McVeigh and Terry
Nichols allegedly blew up the Alfred P. Murrah federal building, killing 168 men, women, and
children inside. SeeJames Brooke, New Sitefor Bomb Tial Brings Burdens, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 1996, at A22; Most Say They'd Be FairJurors, DENV. POsT, Feb. 21, 1996, at A12; Oklahoma
City Bombing Trial to Denver Federal Judge Grants the Change of Venue, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 20, 1996,
at C1.
34. Former football star OJ. Simpson was accused of murdering his ex-wife, Nicole Brown
Simpson, and her friend, Ronald Goldman. See O.J. Simpson Is Charged with Ex-lWife's Murder and
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victims are celebrities, such as the trial of the assassination of Robert
F. Kennedy.3'
Regardless of the reasons a trial might become nationally notorious,
pretrial publicity becomes a more difficult issue for the trial court
judge to resolve when the media and the nation are watching."6
Otherwise ordinary crimes that would receive nominal local treatment
become subjects of national engrossment when they involve
"'[m]urder and mystery, society, sex, and suspense."'' 7 Accordingly,
media treatment of the crime is more widespread, and the resultant
publicity about the crime reaches a larger population of potential
jurors than in less notorious cases.' In addition, potential jurors are
more likely to have been exposed to more in-depth, all-encompassing
publicity about the crime, the defendant, or the victim. 9 In short,
the increased scope and detailed nature of pretrial publicity in
nationally notorious cases sets such cases apart from cases of purely
local interest-40
The trial court must examine the scope and nature of pretrial
publicity to measure its prejudicial effect"' If potential jury mem-
bers are biased because of exposure to publicity that, by its scope and
nature, is prejudicial (or if future jurors could be biased by the
publicity but merely have not been picked yet), the trial court must
take the necessary remedial measures to nullify the impact of the
publicity and to ensure a fair trial.42 Those measures, however, must
Death of Companion, CHI. TRIB., June 17, 1994, at 1. After a nine-month trial, with much
attention and publicity, jurors acquitted him in less than four hours. SeeAdam Pertman, "Not
Guilty": Simpson Free After Acquitta; BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 4, 1995, at 1, 22.
35. See People v. Sirhan, 497 P.2d 1121, 1124 (Cal. 1972).
36. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (analyzing difficulties in obtaining fair trials
in age of mass media).
37. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,356 (1966) (quoting State v. Sheppard, 135 N.E.2d
340, 342 (Ohio 1956)).
38. See Minnefor, supra note 9, at 97-100 (noting that cable television coverage of criminal
trials transforms local scandals into international news stories in which media actively participates
to increase entertainment value).
39. See generally James 1K Cady, Note, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 671, 671-72 (1995)
(recounting media's purchase and exposure of minute details concerning O.J. Simpson murder
trial); Scott C. Pugh, Note, CheckbookJournalism, Free Speech, and Fair Trials, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
1739, 1739-40 (1995) (detailing sale of information about O.J. Simpson to tabloid television);
Stephen, supra note 10, at 1064-65 & nn.1-6 (describing intense media circus surrounding
Pamela Smart murder trial).
40. See Minnefor, supra note 9, at 97-99 (asserting that expanded and more intense media
coverage of criminal trials involving well-known defendant or heinous crime transforms local
scandals into national and international media circuses designed to "titillate and entertain").
41. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 357-60 (denouncing trial judge for not considering prejudicial
effect of pretrial publicity).
42. See id. at 358-61 (ruling that in widely publicized criminal cases, trial court must take
all necessary measures to ensure fair trial including limiting number of reporters in courtroom
and closely regulating their conduct, insulating witnesses from media, and controlling release
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not violate other constitutional requirements. Specifically, the First
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press and the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of a speedy and public trial limit the
measures a trial judge may take to ensure a fair trial.4t
Because the change of venue does nothing to lessen the impact of
publicity in nationally notorious trials,' the trial judge must find
alternative measures. But by what test should those measures be
reviewed? This Article suggests that in criminal cases of national
notoriety, if the trial judge uses the proposed procedures reasonably
calculated to nullify the prejudicial effects of pretrial publicity, an
appellate court should presume that the defendant has received a fair
trial despite claims that the jury was actually or was inherently
prejudiced.
Part I of this Article examines the history of pretrial publicity in
American courts and explores the values that the Sixth Amendment
seeks to protect. Part II criticizes the Supreme Court's current
approach to the pretrial publicity problem. Part III analyzes case
studies of nationally notorious trials. Part IV explores remedial
measures reasonably calculated to nullify the effects of prejudicial
publicity and cases in which a trial judge's omission of those measures
constitutes reversible error. Finally, this Article concludes by setting
forth a proposed standard that should be applied in order to ensure
the defendant's right to a fair trial in cases of national notoriety.
I. HISTORY OF PRETRIAL PUBLICITY
A. Historical Background
The history of criminal trials in both England and in the United
States reveals a presumption of openness. The origin of the open
criminal trial can be traced back to English prehistory.45 The moot,
of information to press by witnesses, police officers, and counsel).
Although the Sheppard opinion listed these various techniques for limiting the effects of
pretrial publicity, they have not been adopted by the courts as requirements. In the years
following Sheppard, the Supreme Court retreated from these specifics for the more general
"totality of the circumstances" test.
43. See Breheny & Kelly, supra note 10, at 373-74 (laying out tension between Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of fair trial and First Amendment's right to freedom of press); Scott
Kafker, Comment, The Right to Venue and the Right to an ImpartialJuyy: Resolving the Conflict in the
Federal Constitution, 52 U. CHi. L. REV. 729, 730-31 (1985) (considering constitutional conflict
between First and Sixth Amendments).
44. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (analyzing change of venue as ineffective tool
against pretrial publicity because information often is disseminated nationally in highly-
publicized criminal cases).
45. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 565-67 (1980).
PRETRIAL PUBUCrrv
mentioned in the Kentish laws of the eighth century, was of prehistor-
ic origin and was, in form, an open air assembly of the freemen of the
local population that discussed local affairs.16 It was not a decision-
making body.47 If the parties before it could not make a "loveday"
to settle their dispute, the dispute would be put to a supernatural test,
such as to an Oath or an Ordeal.48
The Ordeal was especially common in criminal cases.49 For
example, a piece of hot iron would be placed in the defendant's hand
for a short time and then the hand would be bandaged. After a few
days, the hand would be inspected for blistering. If there were no
blisters, the defendant was declared innocent."
More than 600 years ago the trial by jury became the principal
method of criminal trials in England.51 Although the early juries
acted essentially as witnesses, the decision in the English Case of the
Imprisonment of Edward Bushell52 transformed the jury into a true fact-
finding body.
However, as English law developed, the presumption of the open
criminal trial did have at least one historical exception. For instance,
in fourteenth-century England's Star Chamber, a strong presumption
in favor of closed proceedings existed, and public access to any type
of legal proceedings was not unusual.53 The Star Chamber arose as
a means of providing remedies for offenses beyond the scope of the
common-law system.54 The Star Chamber was an extension of the
government; 5 it was not unusual, therefore, for the sovereign to
attend, and his prerogative on administering justice regularly
prevailed. 6
Originally associated with acts of treason," the Star Chamber later




50. See id. at 11.
51. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 27 (1965).
52. 6 How. St. Tr. 999 (C.P. 1670) (holding thatjurors may not be fined or imprisoned for
their verdicts).
53. See GEOFFREY RADCLIFFE & GEOFFREY CROSS, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 106 (1977).
54. See i& at 110, 112 (positing that Star Chamber's greatest legacy was supplementing
English criminal law to include various misdemeanors, such as libel and forgery, that were
punished inadequately at common law).
55. See BAKER, supra note 46, at 50.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 51. Although the court became known as the Star Chamber, the star chamber
actually was the room in which the Council met when it was at Westminster. See id. The
chamber was so named due to the gilded stars decorating the roof. See id The sessions that the
Council held there eventually became known as the Court of the Star Chamber. See id. The
Council itself was an appointed group of nobles who met on the king's behalf to consider
petitions in equity for extraordinary relief. See id. at 38. By the sixteenth century the Court of
1996]
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became the predominant forum for criminal jurisdiction, particularly
for those criminal issues that either could not be tried at common law
or involved punishment unsuitable for common jury." Vast abuses
of authority eventually resulted in the Star Chamber's abolition in
1641.59
In the newly-formed United States, the most significant advance-
ment in the debate over access to legal proceedings came on the
heels of Aaron Burr's treason trial.' The former Vice President was
indicted for treason after he formulated plans to seize New Orleans
and to conquer Mexico in spite of PresidentJefferson's proclamation
warning against rebellion.61 In the midst of this infamous trial, the
issue of jury contamination erupted.62 Driven by the public's
curiosity and by Burr's political stance, the events and proceedings
leading up to the trial saturated the newspapers, and the possibility of
a fair trial was in question.63 Given the nature of the crime and the
notoriety of Burr himself, it is easy to see why the trial became the
center of media attention.' As a result, the Circuit Court of
Virginia grappled with the central problem of prejudicial publicity
and juror disqualification.65 Supreme Court Chief Justice Marshall,
who presided over the trial as a circuit judge,66 concluded that the
mere fact that a juror was exposed to pretrial publicity was not
dispositive of his ability to act impartially. 7 Marshall ruled that a
the Star Chamber was associated with the criminal jurisdiction of the Council. See id. at 51.
Ironically, the court was noted for its severity of punishment. See id. Enacted in 1487, the Star
Chamber Act originally was thought to be the source of power for the English Star Chamber
Court. See id. In fact, this Act established a tribunal to resolve issues of subversive activities in
the royal household. See id. The Act placed a popular seal of approval on the Star Chamber's
work in serving as the instrument of discipline for the Tudor monarchy. See C.H.S. FIFOOT,
ENGLISH LAW AND ITS BACKGROUND 86 (1993).
58. See FIFOOT, supra note 57, at 87 (noting that libel, forgery, perjury, riot, and conspiracy
were common issues addressed by Star Chamber).
59. See id.
60. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 2, 3 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692a).
61. SeeJEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE THE JURY 28 (1994).
62. See id. at 38-39. From the convening of the grand jury, the impartiality of the process
was questioned. See id at 38 (surmising that Burr immediately recognized difficulty of receiving
fair trial from grand jury, many of whom were Thomas Jefferson's allies). The original grand
jury consisted of many people who opposed Burr, and the process for selecting substitutes was
disobeyed in favor of handpicking by the federal marshall. See id. at 38-39. The presiding judge,
ChiefJustice John Marshall sitting as a circuit judge, recognized the potential impartiality and
ordered the substiutes removed. See id.
63. See id. at 38.
64. See id.
65. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g).
66. See ABRAMSON, supra note 61, at 38.
67. See Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 51 (observing that disqualification of all jurors who formed
opinions prior to trial would exclude many intelligent jurors capable of rendering impartial
verdict); ABRAMSON, supra note 61, at 41-43.
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juror can be disqualified only if the juror has a strongly-held opinion
about the defendant's guilt or innocence that cannot be set aside.'
Although the Burr trial set the tone for the standard regarding
pretrial publicity and juror bias, it was not until seventy years later in
Reynolds v. United State6 9 that the Supreme Court announced the
standard for reviewing a trial court's finding ofjury prejudice." The
Court ruled that a finding of bias must be based on evidence that the
juror clearly formed an opinion warranting the conclusion that he was
biased, and that "[t]he finding of the trial court.., ought not to be
set aside by a reviewing court, unless the error is manifest."'
Eventually, the effect of the media on legal proceedings gained
recognition,72 and in 1935, with the trial of Bruno Hauptmann for
the kidnapping and murder of the Lindbergh baby, 3 the issue
exploded. Hauptmann's trial triggered the mass media age in trial
coverage because of the nature of the crime and the accessibility of
information surrounding the case.74 In fact, the case generated so
much media exposure that it came to epitomize the "media circus"
that later Court decisions condemned.75 As a consequence of the
extensive media coverage at the Hauptmann trial, the American Bar
Association enacted Canon 35 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a
provision aimed specifically at controlling press coverage in criminal
trials.76 With the advancements in media technology and media
68. See Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 51. "The question must always depend on the strength of and
nature of the opinion which has been formed." Id.
69. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
70. See United States v. Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1878).
71. Id at 156.
72. See, e.g., People v. Feld, 86 P. 1100, 1104-05 (Cal. 1906) (dismissing claim of unfair trial
resulting from newspaper publicity); People v. Stokes, 37 P. 207, 209 (Cal. 1894) (holding that
in situation in which jury read newspaper stories about case during deliberations, subsequent
guilty verdict was reversed); People v. McCoy, 12 P. 272, 273 (Cal. 1886) (holding that jurors'
reading of newspapers that contained matters in connection with trial constituted grounds for
new trial).
73. See State v. Hauptmann, 180 A. 809, 813 (N.J. 1935).
74. See Stephen, supra note 10, at 1068 (asserting that Hauptmann case triggered mass
media coverage of criminal trials).
75. See infra note 100 and accompanying text (citing cases in which media circus prevented
fair trial).
76. See 62 A.B.A. Rep. 1123, 1134-35 (1937). The Canon read:
Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum. The
taking of photographs in the courtroom, during sessions of the court or recesses
between sessions, and the broadcasting of court proceedings are calculated to detract
from the essential dignity of the proceedings, degrade the court and create
misconceptions with respect thereto in the mind of the public and should not be
permitted.
I& Today, pretrial publicity is regulated by Rule 3.6 of the Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility. The rule applies to statements by lawyers, however, and does not control the role
of the media in criminal trials. Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, on the
other hand, states that taking photographs or broadcasting judicial proceedings in a federal
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access to newsworthy stories, the legal community became more
concerned with guiding trial procedures to comport with fairness and
decorum."
B. Modern Court Treatment
1. Stroble v. California
In 1952, the Court confronted the problem of prejudicial publicity
in light of burgeoning media participation in the criminal trial
process in Stroble v. California,78 a case in which the defendant was
convicted of the brutal murder of a six-year-old girl.79 The investiga-
tion immediately focused on the defendant, who quickly confessed
when arrested, three days following the murder." Between the time
of the murder and the arrest, Los Angeles newspapers headlined the
manhunt for the defendant.8 On the day of his arrest, the papers
printed excerpts from his confession, which had been released by the
district attorney's office. 2 In the following days, the papers contin-
ued to report on the story, describing the defendant as "a 'werewolf',
a 'fiend', and a 'sex-mad killer,'"8 3 and on the district attorney's
contention that the defendant was sane and guilty.8 4
On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim that
the newspaper accounts of his arrest and confession were so inflam-
matory that they had made a fair trial in Los Angeles impossible."
courtroom is prohibited. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 53. Congress recently passed legislation that
carves out an exception to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 53, without specifically amending
the rule. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1246. Section 235 of the Act, Closed Circuit Televised Court Proceeding for victims of crime,
provides for non-public coverage of criminal trial proceedings when the venue of the trial has
been changed, and the new venue is greater than 350 miles from the location where the trial
normally would have taken place. The law gives the court discretion to designate who may view
the proceedings. The broadcast signal is the property of the court and therefore any tapes or
recordings made of the proceedings also are the property of the court and must be kept under
seal. The law gives the Judicial Conference of the United States the authority to promulgate
rules or to amend existing rules, to carry out the intent of the legislation, and upon such an
occurrence the force of the section ceases. The law applies retroactively to all cases filed after
January 1, 1995. This legislation will give the victims of the Oklahoma bombing trial access to
closed circuit television broadcast of the trial proceedings in Denver, Colorado.
77. See FED. K CRIM. P. 53 (proclaiming that media should not be allowed in courtrooms).
78. 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
79. See Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 183-84 (1952).
80. See id. at 186-87.
81. See id. at 192.
82. See id.; see also Steve Harvey, Only in L.A., L.A. TIMES, May 2, 1995, at 2B (stating that
during Stroble trial, Times printed names and home addresses ofjurors as well as their photo-
graphs).
83. Stroble 343 U.S. at 192 (quoting text from various newspaper accounts of case).
84. See id.
85. See id. at 193.
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The Court simply noted that the defendant never made an "affirma-
tive showing" by "so much as an affidavit" that any juror actually was
prejudiced by the stories,8 6 and that a simple declaration of a
violation of due process was insufficient to prove it." The Court also
examined four other factors. It noted that the confession printed in
the papers was read into the record four days later at the preliminary
hearing, at which time it would have been available to the public, 8
and that the confession was made voluntarily and was introduced into
evidence during the trial. 9 The Court also considered the fact that
the defendant never moved for a change of venue and that he never
complained of the publicity until after being convicted. 90
2. Marshall v. United States
The requirement that a defendant prove actual juror prejudice
before a conviction can be reversed was challenged implicitly by a
subsequent Supreme Court decision that took the first step to halt
"trial by newspaper."9 In 1959 the Court reversed a federal district
court conviction in Marshall v. United States92 because the jury had
been exposed to newspaper accounts revealing the defendant's
previous convictions.93
During the defendant's trial for unlawfully dispensing a controlled
drug, the prosecutor asked to be allowed to introduce the defendant's
prior conviction of practicing medicine without a license to rebut the
defendant's attempted defense of entrapment 94  The trial judge
refused the request as unduly prejudicial. 9 In the meantime,
however, two newspapers published stories about the defendant's
prior conviction, which several members of the jury read.96 Upon
learning of the possible jury contamination, the trial judge denied a
defense motion for mistrial after the jurors stated that they could
86. See id. at 195.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 193.
89. See id. at 195.
90. See id. at 193-94. The Court also considered a fifth factor when ruling against the
defendant. See id. at 195. It rejected the petitioner's claim that ineffective counsel inhibited an
insanity defense because the petitioner openly waived ajury trial on the insanity issue. See id.
at 195-96.
91. People v. Manson, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265,312 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1976) (citing Marshall
v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312-13 (1959)).
92. 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
93. See Marshal4 360 U.S. at 313.
94. See id. at 311.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 311-12.
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remain impartial even though they had read the articles,97 and the
defendant was convicted. In a two paragraph opinion, the Supreme
Court reversed and remanded for a new trial stating that prejudice to
a defendant is just as great when disallowed evidence reaches the jury
through the newspapers as when it is introduced by the prosecu-
tion.9"
For the first time, the Court hinted that a trial might be unfair
when a juror is exposed merely to possibly prejudicial publicity.9
This hint would become the dominant theme in subsequent cases as
the Court tried to remedy the "media circus" created by a press
aggressively pursuing its First Amendment rights."°
3. Irvin v. Dowd
Just two years later, the Supreme Court handed down the opinion
in Irvin v. Dowd,' a case in which the defendant appealed his
murder conviction and sentence of death, claiming a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment."2 The police had arrested the defendant
for six murders committed near a small Indiana community.0 3
Shortly after the arrest, the county prosecutor released a press report
stating that the defendant had confessed to the murders. 1" Local
papers publicized the murders, arrest, and confession for the six
months prior to the trial."0 In response, the trial court granted a
97. See id. at 312. One of the articles identified the defendant, Howard R. Marshall, as the
man who acted as the "doctor" for country singer Hank Williams, prescribing "restricted drugs"
for the singer prior to his death. See id.
98. See id. at 312-13.
99. See id. The Court limited its holding in Marshall however, by stating that it had
reversed Marshall's conviction "expressly '[i]n the exercise of [its] supervisory power to
formulate and apply proper standards for enforcement of the criminal law in federal courts,'
and not as a matter of constitutional compulsion." Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 797 (1975)
(quoting Marshall 360 U.S. at 313). "In the face of so clear a statement, it cannot be
maintained that Marshall was a constitutional ruling now applicable, through the Fourteenth
Amendment, to the States.... We cannot agree that Marshall has any application beyond the
federal courts." Id. at 797-98.
100. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966) (reversing murder conviction
because of "carnival atmosphere at trial" created by trial judge's accommodation of media's
excesses); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 550-52 (1965) (reversing conviction because live broad-
casting of two days of pretrial hearings to more than 100,000 viewers and potential jurors
violated constitutional guarantees of fair trial); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723,726-27 (1963)
(reversing murder conviction and death sentence because of pretrial televising of police station
"interview" in which defendant confessed to bank robbery, kidnapping, and murder).
101. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
102. See Irvin v. Dowd, 153 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ind, 1957), aff'd, 251 F.2d 548 (7th Cir.), rev'd,
359 U.S. 948 (1958), remanded for reconsideration, 271 F.2d 552 (7th Cir. 1959), vacated, 366 U.S.
717 (1961).
103. See Irin, 366 U.S. at 725.
104. See Irvin, 359 U.S. at 396-97.
105. See Irvin, 366 U.S. at 725-26. The media thoroughly detailed the defendant's criminal
history, including references to offenses committed as a juvenile. See id. at 725. The stories
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change of venue-but only to the neighboring county.106  Three
further motions for another change of venue, as well as eight motions
for continuances, were denied.
10 7
In vacating the conviction and remanding the case,108 the Su-
preme Court acknowledged that ajuror need not be totally ignorant
of the facts and issues involved, but that a juror is sufficiently
impartial if he can "lay aside his impression or opinion and render a
verdict based on the evidence presented in court."09 Quoting Lord
Coke, the court stated that "a juror must be as 'indifferent as he
stands unsworne,"' 0 and held that the proper inquiry is whether
the "nature and strength of the opinion formed"' i is such that the
actual existence of partiality can be presumed."'
Noting that "a barrage of newspaper headlines, articles, cartoons,
and pictures was unleashed""8 against the defendant during the
months preceding the trial, the Court found that the community
reflected "'a pattern of deep and bitter prejudice""' 4 against the
defendant. A searching examination of the voir dire showed that
ninety percent of the 430-person venire entertained an opinion that
the defendant was guilty, 5 and that eight of the twelve jurors finally
seated thought that the defendant was guilty, with some admitting
that it would take evidence to overcome their opinion." 6  The
Court concluded that under these circumstances a finding of
impartiality would not meet constitutional standards. 7
4. Rideau v. Louisiana
In 1963, the Supreme Court, impatient with permissive trial judges
and an exploitative media," departed significantly from its prior
requirement that a defendant show actual prejudice before succeed-
provided step-by-step accounts of his police line-up identification, lie detector test, and ultimate
confession to the slayings. See id. On the day before the trial, the newspapers reported that the
defendant admitted to the murders of six people. See id. at 726.
106. See Irv/n, 359 U.S. at 397.
107. See id. at 898.
108. See Irvin, 366 U.S. at 729.
109. Id. at 723 (citing Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 248 (1910); Spies v. Illinois, 123
U.S. 131, 133 (1887); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 157 (1878)).
110. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722 (quoting language of Lord Coke).
111. d. at 723 (citing Reynold&, 98 U.S. at 156).
112. See id.
113. Id. at 725.
114. Id. at 727.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 727-28.
117. See id.
118. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726-27 (1963) (denigrating media for trying
defendant in press and for turning trial into "kangaroo court proceedings").
19961
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ing on a Sixth Amendment claim," 9 and adopted the implied
rationale of Marshall,12° which allowed for reversal in the face of
presumed prejudice."' The defendant in Rideau v. Lousiana2
was arrested for robbing a bank, kidnapping three bank employees,
and killing one of them. 23 Following the arrest, the parish sheriff
filmed an "interview" in which the defendant confessed to the
crimes."' During the next three days, television stations broadcast
the film, which was seen by approximately 97,000 of the parish's
150,000 residents." The trial judge refused a motion for change of
venue, and the jury quickly convicted the defendant and sentenced
him to death.2 6
The Supreme Court did not conduct a detailed examination of the
voir dire transcript and held that the denial of the change of venue
request violated due process. 127 The Court held that the possibility
that some of the jurors had seen the televised confession was enough
to create a presumption of juror bias because the trial judge did not
take the remedial action of granting the change of venue. 2 This
loosened standard of presumed prejudice became the theory upon
which appeals were based during the following decade.
29
The dissenters in Rideau agreed "that one is deprived of due
process of law when he is tried in an environment so permeated with
hostility that judicial proceedings can be 'but a hollow formality."
' 30
They did not agree with the majority's application of presumed
prejudice, however, and would have affirmed the conviction because
119. See Stroblev. California, 343 U.S. 181, 195 (1952) (stating that mere assertion of unfair
trial, without any affidavits to provejurors actually were prejudiced by pretrial newspaper stories,
is insufficient claim of due process violation).
120. 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
121. See Rideau, 373 U.S. at 727 (impliedly following decision in Marshall whereby presumed
prejudice warrants reversal).
122. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
123. See Rideau, 373 U.S. at 723-24.
124. See id. at 724. The "interview" between the defendant and the sheriff was taped and
parts were replayed on television.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 724-25.
127. See id. at 728.
128. See id.
129. See, e.g., United States v. Macino, 468 F.2d 750, 752 (7th Cir. 1973) (stating that "preju-
dice ... must, at some point, be presumed to result from an inordinate delay in bringing a
defendant to trial"); United States v. DeTienne, 468 F.2d 151, 156 (7th Cir. 1972) (determining
that 19-month post-indictment delay in prosecution gave rise to certain amount of presumed
prejudice); United States v. Canty, 469 F.2d 114, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("One significant form
of prejudice is the prolonged detention which can be imposed on a defendant .. ").
130. Rideau, 373 U.S. at 729 (Clark, J., dissenting). The dissent justified the result in Irvin
by noting that the voir dire record demonstrated "the complete permeation, imbedding
opinions of guilt in the minds of 90% of the veniremen and two-thirds of the actual jury." Id.
at 731 (citing Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961)).
1996] PRE AL PuBLicY 55
the record did not show that publicity actually infected the trial.'
Without proof of "any substantial nexus" between the publicity and
the trial, the dissenters argued, the majority's inference failed for lack
of support."3 2
5. Estes v. Texas
Two years later, the Supreme Court again approached the issue of
pretrial publicity in Estes v. Texas.' In a 5-4 decision,"M the Court
held that the televising of a defendant's pretrial and trial proceedings
was sufficient to warrant reversal on grounds that such publicity
violated the defendant's due process rights. 5 The majority took
great care to establish authority for the doctrine that a due process
violation does not require the showing of actual, identifiable
prejudice, but could be presumed from the procedures employed by
the state during the adjudicative process.
136
Acknowledging that deprivation of due process requires, in most
cases, a showing of identifiable prejudice to the accused, the Court
found that "at times a procedure employed by the State involves such
a probability that prejudice will result that it is deemed inherently
lacking in due process.' 37  The Court listed four ways in which
131. See id. at 729 (Clark,J., dissenting).
132. See id. (Clark,J., dissenting).
133. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
134. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 532 (1965). Justices Stewart, Black, Brennan, and White
dissented.
135. See id. at 542-44. Sixteen years later, the Supreme Court clarified that Estes does not
mandate a per se ban on television coverage. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 582 (1981).
The Court held that states are free to allow television coverage if the trial court recognizes no
threat to the fairness of the trial. See id.
136. See Estes, 381 U.S. at 541-44. The Court stated that "our system of law has always
endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.... [T]o perform its high function
in the best way 'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."' Id. at 543 (quoting In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). In addition, the Court stated that "[e]very procedure
which ... might lead [the average person] not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between
the state and the accused denies the latter due process of law." See id. (citing Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)); see, ag., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 352, 353-54 (1966)
(explaining probability of prejudice from "totality of circumstances" when (1) defendant is not
granted change of venue away from heated publicity; (2) judge has not sequestered jury; (3)
anonymous letters are sent to prospective jurors; (4) charges and countercharges are aired in
media; and (5) three-day inquest examination of defendant without counsel was aired live on
television before trial); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 473 (1965) (discussing "extreme
prejudice inherent" in allowing deputies, who were key prosecution witnesses, to drive jurors to
meals and lodgings during trial); Rideau, 373 U.S. at 727 (finding refusal to grant request for
change of venue after local community has been affected by repeated exposure to accused's
television confession denial of due process); cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963)
(holding that right of indigent defendant to counsel in criminal trial is fundamental right);
White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (finding that absence of counsel when entering plea
before court is violation of Fourteenth Amendment).
137. Estes, 381 U.S. at 542-43.
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allowing the televising of court proceedings would cause unfairness to
the accused." a  These include the potential negative impact on
jurors, witness testimony, judicial responsibility, and the defendant
himself.
13 9
6. Sheppard v. Maxwell
The doctrine of presumed prejudice reached its zenith in the
nationally notorious trial of Sheppard v. Maxwell 4° The case arose
when Marilyn Sheppard, Dr. Sam Sheppard's pregnant wife, was
brutally bludgeoned to death in their home. 4 ' From the outset, the
investigation focused on Dr. Sheppard." The media leaped on the
story, demanding action against Dr. Sheppard, who professed his
innocence throughout. 43
Sensationalist headlines announced that Sheppard refused to take
a lie-detector test and that his family was throwing a "protective ring"
around him.'" These headlines repeatedly stressed Sheppard's lack
of cooperation with the police and demanded that he confess.
145
Stories stated that the police had cleared other suspects after they had
passed lie-detector tests and urged that Sheppard be arrested.1
46
Upon a search of the house by the police, the county coroner told
his men that "it is evident that the doctor did this, so let's go get the
confession out of him."'47 He then interrogated Sheppard, who was
under sedation, in his hospital room.'48 On the day of Mrs.
Sheppard's funeral, the future chief prosecutor of the case was quoted
138. See id. at 545-50. The dissent argued that Estes involved a different problem than that
presented in Rideau because in Estes the Court refused to review petitioner's claim that pretrial
publicity had a prejudicial effect on the jurors and because the issue on appeal was whether the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited television and still cameras from criminal trials. See id. at
610, 614 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing Rideau, 373 U.S. at 723). The dissent also noted that
the jurors themselves never saw the broadcasts of the trial, and were sequestered from anyone
who had seen the broadcasts. See id at 613 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
139. See id. at 545-50. Televising court proceedings may cause jurors to be affected by
community pressure, preoccupation with television rather than testimony, and criticism from
friends and relatives. See id. at 54548. Wiimesses conscious of being viewed by a vast audience
may become frightened, cocky, embarrassed, or given to overstatement. See id. at 547. Elected
judges utilize the trial as a political weapon to enhance their chances of re-election. See id. at
548. The defendant may be mentally harassed knowing that the trial is televised. See id. at 549.
140. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
141. See Sheppard 384 U.S. at 335.
142. See id. at 337.
143. See id. at 340.
144. See id. at 338.
145. See id. at 338-42.
146. See id. at 341.
147. Id. at 335.
148. See id. at 338.
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criticizing Sheppard's lack of cooperation with the police. 4 The
coroner later held a public "inquest" at which he questioned
Sheppard. 5 ° Sheppard's lawyers were not allowed to participate
and were, in fact, thrown out by the coroner to "cheers, hugs and
kisses from the ladies in the audience." 5' The newspapers began
speculating on rumors of Sheppard's extramarital affairs.'52 He
then was arrested.
53
The publicity, which grew in intensity throughout Sheppard's
indictment and trial, was encouraged, no doubt, by the trial judge
who was up for re-election." The judge reserved most of the
courtroom for the press, including a table that ran the width of the
courtroom inside the bar railing.5 5  The media used all of the
rooms on the courtroom floor, broadcasting newscasts from them
throughout the trial. 6  Reporters continuously photographed
witnesses, counsel, and jurors, and published the pictures. News
media movement in and out of the courtroom caused so much
commotion that the jury often could not hear witnesses testify.5 8
Reporters eavesdropped on conversations between Sheppard and his
lawyer and reported the conversations in papers accessible to the
jury.'59 The jury, not surprisingly, convicted Sheppard."6°
The Supreme Court listed nine episodes of "flagrant" judicially
encouraged press abuses in an 8-1 decision' reversing Sheppard's
conviction and remanding the case for a new trial.'62 Noting that
"' [1] egal trials are not like elections, to be won through the use of the
meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspaper,""' 63 the Court followed
the totality of the circumstances approach used in Estes and Rideau,
and presumed a reasonable likelihood of prejudice resulting from the
extensive publicity without requiring a showing that prejudice actually
149. See id.
150. See id. at 339.
151. id. at 340.
152. See i& at 340.
153. See id. at 341.
154. See id. at 342 (stating that case came to trial two weeks before November general
election in which chief prosecutor was candidate for common pleas judge and trial judge was
up for re-election).
155. See id. at 343.
156. See id.
157. See id at 343-44.
158. See id. at 344.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 335.
161. See id. at 345-49. Three of the dissenting Justices in Estes voted with the majority in
Sheppard.
162. See id.
163. Id. at 350 (quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 271 (1941)).
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existed."6 The Court concluded that the real cure is to prevent any
prejudicial influence by taking steps, through rule and regulation, to
protect the processes from outside interference. 16 In other words,
the taint of prejudicial publicity could have been avoided or removed
if the trial court had taken certain measures. As the trial court did
not do so, the Court presumed the jury was prejudiced against
Sheppard.
C. The Current Approach
1. Murphy v. Florida
Estes and Sheppard indicated a willingness by the Supreme Court to
reverse convictions in the event of sensationalist publicity, which,
because of its inflammatory nature and extensive scope, led to a
presumption of unfairness in the trial process." In 1975, the
Court, apparently less willing to presume prejudice than in the past,
modified its analysis in Murphy v. Florida.167 In Murphy, the defen-
dant was convicted in state court of assault with the intent to commit
robbery and breaking and entering of a home with intent to commit
robbery." On appeal, he contended that he was denied a fair trial
because jurors had learned, from news accounts, of his prior felony
convictions.'69 The defendant was notorious, having played a role
in the 1964 theft of the Star of India sapphire from a museum in New
164. See id. at 351-52; see also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538-44 (1965) (finding that
defendant's due process rights were violated by high degree of pretrial publicity despite fact that
no isolated prejudice could be demonstrated); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 723-26 (1963)
(finding that defendant's due process rights were violated because trial court refused to change
venue even after local community opinion was prejudiced due to repeated and in-depth
exposure to spectacle of defendant's confession to crimes). The totality of the circumstances
test is derived from the Supreme Court's opinion in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). In Irvin,
the Court defined the totality of the circumstances test as consisting of three parts: (1) an
examination of the voir dire for juror hostility; (2) an examination of the general atmosphere
surrounding the courtroom at the time of the trial; and (3) an examination of the length to
which the trial court must go to obtain impartial jurors. See id. at 720-25.
165. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363. Noting that "[tjhe [trial] court's fundamental error is
compounded by the holding that it lacked power to control the publicity about the trial," the
Court listed seven remedies that would have guaranteed a fair trial: (1) limiting the presence
of the press at judicial proceedings when it is apparent that the accused might otherwise be
prejudiced; (2) insulating the witnesses from the press; (3) exercising control over the release
of leads, information, and gossip to the press by police, witnesses, and counsel; (4) continuing
the case when there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to the trial will prevent
a fair trial; (5) changing the venue to a county not so permeated with publicity; (6) sequestering
the jury; and (7) ordering a new trial if it is apparent that the accused cannot get a fair trial.
See id. at 357-59, 363.
166. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
167. 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
168. See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 795 (1975).
169. See id. at 795.
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York.' He also had been indicted for murder and for the inter-
state transportation of stolen securities."' His flamboyant lifestyle
made him a media favorite; the press nicknamed him "Murph the
Surf."
17 2
Murphy's trial drew extensive media coverage, and the press
reported on all of his previous "trials and tribulations."'7 The voir
dire indicated that some of the jurors knew of his past convictions
from press accounts, and one juror admitted that he might be
predisposed to find against the defendant. 74 The jury convicted
Murphy, and the Supreme Court upheld the conviction despite
Marshal's implication that juror exposure to unduly prejudicial
information raises a presumption ofjuror bias.
175
170. See id.
171. See id. at 796.
172. See id. at 795. Defendant's nickname originated from fact that he once won a Florida
state surfing championship and later started a surfboard company. SeeJay Homing, Murph the
SuifFinds Salvation, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 27, 1992, at 4A.
173. Murphy, 421 U.S. at 796.
174. See id. at 800-02. During voir dire, the following exchange occurred between defense
counsel and ajuror.
Q. Now, when you go into that jury room and you decide upon Murphy's guilt or
innocence, you are going to take into account [the] fact that he is a convicted
murderer; aren't you?
A. Not if we are listening to the case, I wouldn't.
Q. But you know about it?
A. How can you not know about it?
Q. Fine, thank you.
When you go into the jury room, the fact that he is a convicted murderer, that is
going to influence your verdict; is it not?
A. We are not trying him for murder.
Q. The fact that he is a convicted murderer and jewel thief, that would influence
your verdict?
A. I didn't know he was a convicted jewel thief.
Q. Oh, I see.
I am sorry I put words in your mouth.
Now, sir, after two or three weeks if being locked up in a downtown hotel, as the
Court determines, and after hearing the state's case, and after hearing no case on
behalf of Murphy, and hearing no testimony from Murphy saying, "I am innocent, Mr.
(juror's name),"--when you go into the jury room, sir, all these facts are going to
influence your verdict?
A. I imagine it would be.
Q. And in fact, you are saying if Murphy didn't testify, and if he doesn't offer
evidence, "My experience of him is such that right now I would find him guilty."
A. I believe so.
Id. at 801-02 n.5.
175. See id. at 798; Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312-13 (1959). The Court did not
decide Marshall on constitutional grounds, but based its holding on "the exercise of [its]
supervisory power to formulate and apply proper standards for enforcement of the criminal law
in the federal courts." Marshal4 360 U.S. at 313; see also McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332,
339-40 (1943) (emphasizing need for violation of fundamental right to reverse conviction);
Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 293-94 (1939) (articulating that technical errors, defects,
or exceptions that do not affect substantive rights should be disregarded). Interestingly, Chief
Justice Burger, in his concurrence in Murphy, agreed "that the circumstances of petitioner's trial
THE AMERICAN UNnERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:39
The Court, in formulating a new two-part test, interpreted the Irvin,
Rideau, Estes, and Sheppard line of cases.'" 6 In the first part of the
test, the Court found that prejudice will be presumed "where there is
an apparent and flagrant departure from fundamental due process
and decorum and an intrusion of external influences."'77 In both
Estes and Sheppard the Court allowed uncontrolled media access to the
entire trial process, including access to the courtroom itself."7 The
press' unconstrained activities and sensationalist conduct made those
trials, and any subsequent court proceedings in those saturated
communities, "but a hollow formality.""7 9 In both Irvin and Rideau,
the press repeatedly published the accused's confessions, creating a
presumption of jury bias."s In all four cases, the press' lack of
restraint gave the trials a carnival feeling, dooming the defendants
from the beginning.'
Holding that Murphy's trial did comport with restraint and judicial
control over external influences enough to raise the presumption of
impartiality,8 2 the Court then looked to the second part of the test:
whether there were "any indications in the totality of [the] circum-
did not rise to the level of a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
[but] I would not hesitate to reverse petitioner's conviction in the exercise of our supervisory
powers, were this a federal case." Murphy, 421 U.S. at 804 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
176. See Murphy, 421 U.S. at 797-99.
177. People v. Manson, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265, 315 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1976). With respect
to Irv/n, Rideau, Estes, and Sheppard, the Court in Murphy stated:
The proceedings in these cases were entirely lacking in the solemnity and sobriety to
which a defendant is entitled in a system that subscribes to any notion of fairness and
rejects the verdict of a mob. They cannot be made to stand for the proposition that
juror exposure to information about a state defendant's prior convictions or to news
accounts of the crime with which he is charged alone presumptively deprives the
defendant of due process.
Murphy, 421 U.S. at 799; see also Goldsmith, supra note 164, at 297-98 (discussing Murphy as
retreat from opinions of 1960s that were more harsh on press and more lenient on defendant,
and suggesting that pretrial prejudice will not be presumed in state cases unless outrageous facts
are presented).
178. In reviewing the Estes trial, the Supreme Court wryly noted that as the defendant's
counsel argued that cameras should be excluded from the courtroom, a photographer wandered
behind the bench and "snapped his picture." Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 536 (1965). In
Sheppard, the Court found "that bedlam reigned at the courthouse during the trial and newsmen
took over practically the entire courtroom, hounding most of the participants in the trial,
especially Sheppard." Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 335 (1966).
179. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963) (describing Estes and Sheppard trials).
180. See id. at 724 (admitting into evidence 20-minute film of Rideau's confession that had
been broadcast three times to roughly 50,000 people in local community); Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717, 728 (1961) (acknowledging that two-thirds ofjurors were of opinion that defendant
was guilty and that those beliefs were based on knowledge of previous murders).
181. See State v. Sheppard, 135 N.E.2d 340, 342 (Ohio 1956). "Throughout the preindict-
ment investigation, the subsequent legal skirmishes and the nine-week trial, circulation-conscious
editors catered to the insatiable interest of the American public in the bizarre .... In this
atmosphere of a 'Roman holiday' for the news media, Sam Sheppard stood trial for his life."
Id.
182. See Murphy, 421 U.S. at 799.
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stances that petitioner's trial was not fundamentally fair."Im The
Court examined the circumstances of the trial to determine if any
"indicia of impartiality" existed that would indicate impermissible jury
prejudice.l&
The Court first noted that juror impartiality did not demand juror
ignorance of the facts and issues." Rather, if a juror could put
aside any personal impressions or opinions and render a verdict based
on evidence presented in court, the juror could be considered impar-
tial."'6 In particular, the Court: (1) examined the voir dire record,
searching for juror hostility; (2) considered the atmosphere of the
community at the time of the trial; and (3) considered the length to
which the trial court had to go to select impartial jurors.8 7 Accord-
ingly, although the jurors had been exposed to possibly prejudicial
publicity about the defendant, the Court found them sufficiently
impartial to fulfill the task.i" The lone dissent in Murphy highlight-
ed the Court's apparent shift away from a willingness to reverse
convictions by noting that four of the seated jurors explicitly indicated
that they would hold against the defendant his past convictions, which
the jurors had learned of through press accounts against him.89
2. Patton v. Yount
In 1984, the Court again signaled its hesitance to reverse convic-
tions possibly tainted with pretrial publicity. In Patton v. Yount 1"°
the Court accepted the Irvin premise that intense adverse publicity
can create such a presumption of prejudice in a trial that a juror's
claim of impartiality should not be believed. 9' The Court, however,
focused its analysis on the premise that a trial court's finding ofjuror
183. Id
184. See id. at 802.
185. See id. at 799-800.
186. See id. at 800 (citing Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961)). "We must distinguish
between mere familiarity with petitioner ... and an actual predisposition against him. To
ignore the real differences in the potential for prejudice would not advance the cause of
fundamental fairness, but only make impossible the timely prosecution of persons who are well
known in the community .... Id. at 801 n.4.
187. See id. at 802-03.
188. See id. at 803; see also People v. Manson, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265, 316-18 (App. Dep't Super.
Ct. 1976) (failing to find any appreciable hostility in voir dire when less than one-fourth of
potential jurors admitted to any disqualifying prejudices).
189. Murphy, 421 U.S. at 804-08 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
190. 467 U.S. 1025 (1984).
191. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 (1984); see also Irvin, 366 U.S. at 728 (stating
that although "each juror was sincere when he said that he would be fair and impartial to peti-
tioner ... such a statement of impartiality can be given little weight").
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impartiality could be overturned only when there was manifest
error,192 a very difficult standard for a defendant to meet.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had remanded the defendant's
conviction for a second trial after finding that his confession had
been secured improperly."93 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then
found, after a second conviction, that the publicity between the first
trial and the second trial had subsided significantly.194  On appeal,
the United States Supreme Court found that the passage of time
between the two trials had a softening effect on the community,
allowing the inflamed public passion to cool.'95 The Court held
that this passage of time rebutted any presumption of bias and found
that there was abundant support for the trial court's conclusion that
publicity had little effect on the second trial. 9 The Court also
found that the question of whetherjurors have disqualifying opinions
is a question of fact, and that the trial court's findings of impartiality
were thus afforded a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d). 197
The dissent, focusing on the nature of the voir dire, noted that
publicity had reached all but one of the twelve jurors as well as two of
the alternates who eventually were impaneled. 9 One of the seated
jurors and two of the alternates testified that they had opinions that
192. See Patton, 467 U.S. at 1031, 1035; see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156
(1878) (finding manifest error when after consideration of all evidence, it was clear that juror
formed opinion that could not, in law, be deemed impartial).
193. See Commonwealth v. Yount, 256 A.2d 464, 466 (Pa. 1969).
194. See Commonwealth v. Yount, 314 A.2d 242, 247-48 (Pa. 1974).
195. Patton, 467 U.S. at 1032-34. Adverse publicity and community outrage were at their
height prior to Yount's first trial in 1966. See id. at 1032. Jury selection for Yount's second trial
occurred four years later in 1970. See id
196. See id. at 1035.
197. See id. at 1036-37. In a federal habeas corpus case in which the partiality of an
individual juror is at issue, the question is not one of mixed law and fact, but rather one of
historical fact: "Did ajuror swear that he could set aside any opinion he might hold and decide
the case on the evidence, and should thejuror's protestation of impartiality have been believed."
Id. at 1036. The federal habeas corpus statute creates a presumption of correctness in a trial
court's finding ofjuror impartiality. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994). The presumption may be
overcome if the appellant can establish by convincing evidence in a federal court evidentiary
hearing that the factual determination by the state court was erroneous and "not fairly
supported by the record." Id. § 2254(d)(8). Reasons for this presumption of correctness
include respecting the extended voir dire proceedings designed specifically to identify biased
venirement and trusting the trial judge's judgment regarding the demeanor of prospective
jurors. See Patton, 467 U.S. at 1038. But cf. Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 508 (1971)
(holding that state law, which prevents change of venue forjury trial in criminal case, regardless
of extent of local prejudice against defendant, violates right to impartial jury guaranteed by
Fourteenth Amendment); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966) (asserting that
appellate courts have duty to make independent examination of circumstances in light of
pervasiveness of modem communications and difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from
jurors' minds).
198. See Patton, 467 U.S. at 1040 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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would change only if the defendant could convince them to do
so.109 Five other jurors stated that they had opinions, but that they
would not carry them into the jury box.
2 0
°
I. CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT TEST
The Supreme Court, by applying a totality of the circumstances test
to judge the merits of a petitioner's claim of a biased jury, has
recognized the difficulties inherent in managing pretrial publicity.
The most effective way to ensure an unbiased jury is through
complete closure to the press and public. Of course, our common-law
history provides for public criminal trials as a method of government
accountability, and the presumption of openness now is a constitu-
tional guarantee.01 Closely related is the inevitable clash between
the First Amendment and the Sixth Amendment whenever pretrial
publicity becomes an issue.202 With neither Amendment reigning
supreme, courts must satisfy the often opposing interests each
21amendment protects. °  Significantly, the Sixth Amendment re-
quires impartial jurors, not ignorant jurors,0 4 thus accepting that
jurors might know inadmissible or irrelevant facts and issues at
trial.2 5 Finally, publicity is itself an insidious phenomenon because
199. See id. at 1045-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
200. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
201. SeeU.S. CONsr. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment states: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a public trial .... " Id.; see Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603-07 (1982) (finding that right of public access to criminal trials is
protected by First Amendment to help ensure proper functioning of judicial process and
government as whole, but that government may limit access by showing narrowly tailored
compelling governmental interest); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573
(1980) (concluding that presumption of openness to public to attend trial is inherent in nature
of criminal trial system and in First and Fourteenth Amendments unless some other overriding
consideration requires closure); see also Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 349-50 (enunciating principle that
American courts long have distrusted trials conducted behind wall of secrecy). But see Press
Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984) ("The presumption of openness may be
overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve
higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.").
202. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 539 (1976) (holding it unnecessary to
establish priority between First and Sixth Amendment rights to fair trial in all circumstances, but
noting that protection against prior restraint should have particular force when applied to
criminal case reporting); see also NewYork Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971)
(holding that government had not met its heavy burden of showing justification for prior
restraint to restrict publication of excerpts of study of Vietnam War and Pentagon Papers).
203. See supra notes 201 and 202 (citing cases showing conflict arising between First and Sixth
Amendments when pretrial publicity becomes issue).
204. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("[T]he accused shall enjoy the right to a... public trial,
by an impartial jury ... ").
205. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1035 (1984) (concluding that relevant question is
not juror memory of case, but whether jurors have fixed opinions preventing impartial
judgment); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799-800 (1975) (holding that jurors need not be
totally ignorant of facts and issues at trial); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 733 (1963)
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it spreads rapidly and often creates unrealized biases in those
exposed.06
Jurors who may believe themselves to be unaffected by pretrial
publicity may be mistaken. Although the empirical research still is
limited, it appears that jurors who are exposed to factual pretrial
publicity are significantly more likely to convict a defendant than
those not exposed when there has been no delay between the
exposure and the trial.0 7 In addition, judicial admonitions appear
to have no real effect on jury verdicts.2 8  The reality is that even
judges find it difficult to mark the degree to which a potential juror's
opinions are fixed as a result of pretrial publicity.2"
The competing constitutional interests and the necessarily fact-
specific inquiry into a juror's possible bias makes a totality of the
circumstances test attractive. Such an approach gives the trial judge
great discretion in administering justice by allowing him to tailor a
fact-specific "fair result.""0 Increasing a judge's independence,
however, likely will result in diminished uniformity in the law.
211
Equal treatment under the law thus suffers, predictable results
become uncertain, and judicial restraint, a hallmark in a democratic
system subject to the "rule of laws," is ignored. 12
The "totality of the circumstances" test presumes that the law will
develop case-by-case. The Supreme Court, in accepting some facts as
dispositive while rejecting others in specific factual settings, has moved
toward a fully articulated "form" of law.213 This approach, however,
(stating that jurors' claims that they can discount influence of external factors should not be
easily discarded); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961) (noting that to require juror
ignorance would be to establish "impossible standard").
206. Although the empirical research on the subject is limited, studies strongly suggest that
prejudicial pretrial publicity affects juror verdicts and is not cured by current voir dire
techniques or by challenges. Thus, judicial confidence in those techniques might be
unfounded. See Norbert L. Kerr et al., On the Effectiveness of Voir Dire in Criminal Cases with
Prejudicial Pretrial Publicity: An Empirical Study, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 665, 695 (1991) (noting that
effects of pretrial publicity survive exclusion of jurors who admit difficulty in disregarding
publicity); Stanley Sue et al., Authoritarianism, Pretrial Publicity, and Awareness of Bias in Simulated
Jurors, 37 PSYCHOL. REP. 1299, 1299-1300 (1975) (finding that in experiment examining
influence of pretrial publicity on ability of individuals to disqualify themselves for being biased,
results indicated, after omitting self-excusals, that jurors who were exposed to prejudicial
publicity were more likely to convict than those not exposed).
207. See Kerr et al., supra note 206, at 675.
208. See id.
209. SeeYount v. Patton, 710 F.2d 956, 972 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984).
210. See Scalia, supra note 28, at 1176 (contrasting manner in which Louis IX of France and
King Solomon dispensed case-by-case justice using their personal discretion with writings of
Thomas Paine and Aristotle, who espoused "general rule of law").
211. See id. at 1179.
212. See id.
213. See id. at 1178 (determining that common-law approach is "ill suited to our legal system
because the idyllic notion of 'the court' gradually closing in on a fully articulated rule of law by
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ignores the reality that the Court visits a particular issue infrequently,
resulting in long periods of silence between Court clarifications.
214
The Murphy/Patton approach gives the widest discretion to trial
courts to develop remedial measures. In reviewing the trial court's
exercise of discretion, the appellate court examines the atmosphere
of the trial for any presumed due process violations and for indicia of
impartiality in the venire process.215  However, this approach
provides little guidance for future trial courts to apply; the appellate
court simply compares the current factual situation on review with
past factual situations to determine if there is a close enough fit
between the two to warrant a similar result.21 6 Such an approach is
necessarily backward looking, yet pretrial publicity requires that trial
judges employ proactive measures to combat it. Just as a person
cannot avoid being assaulted by running away after getting punched,
once prejudicial publicity is in the community, the punch is thrown.
The current approach allows trial courts to use whatever techniques
they may choose, in hopes that, on review, they got it right. Appellate
court review of many cases in the aggregate may provide clarification,
but it may provide an unwanted (and unnecessary) result of reversals
as well.217
deciding one discrete fact situation after another until (by process of elimination, as it were) the
truly operative facts become apparent").
214. The Supreme Court generally hears approximately one-twentieth of one percent of all
the cases decided by the federal district courts and less than one-half of one percent of all cases
decided by the federal courts of appeal. See id. at 1179. In light of this statistic, a standards-
based approach that examines the specific facts of each case, cannot lead to an effective
articulation of the law that is meaningful. See id. at 1179.
215. See supra notes 177-89 and accompanying text (noting that impartiality was not found
in voir dire process after analyzing voir dire transcript using Murphy totality of circumstances test,
and that jury as whole in Patton was impartial because prejudicial publicity was greatly
diminished in second trial that transpired four years later).
216. See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 797-99 (1975) (comparing fact pattern with four
other cases: Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965);
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961)).
217. See Scalia, supra note 28, at 1179 (noting that when "totality of circumstances" test is
used, 13 courts of appeal and 50 state supreme courts, rather than Supreme Court, will decide
what standard to use, and this approach will weaken uniformity in law). Justice Scalia suggests
that "when an appellate judge comes up with nothing better than a totality of the circumstances
test to explain his decision, he is not so much pronouncing the law in the normal sense as
engaging in the less exalted function of fact finding." Id. at 1180. Accordingly, the resultant
product of such a test is of limited utility, although it resolves the question at issue, it has little
value for future applications. See id. at 1181. Professor Thomas Monaghan argues that there
are three aspects in the relationship between law and fact. See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitu-
tional Fact Review, 85 CoLuM. L. REv. 229, 234 (1985). "Law declaration" yields conclusions
about the content of governing legal rules and is general in character. See id at 235. "Fact
identification" is case specific and does not implicate legal rules. See id. "Law application"
relates the legal rule to the facts adduced to give a legal conclusion. Id. at 236. Constitutional
fact review is the doctrine whereby appellate courts engage in law application of constitutional
issues to ensure uniformity in the law. See id. at 238. Professor Monaghan argues that the duty
of appellate courts is limited to law declaration, and that when law application needs further
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Predictability, an essential attribute of law is the major casualty of
a totality of the circumstances approach. When the Court utilizes this
approach, it becomes difficult to determine which facts may tip the
balance.21 Would the Court have upheld Rideau's conviction if the
media had broadcast his confession only once or late at night?19
Would Estes' conviction, reversed because the trial was televised, be
upheld today?22 What if a defendant does not exercise all of his
peremptory challenges during voir dire or fails to request a change of
venue-does that indicate an acceptance that the jury is impartial and
equate a waiver on review of the fairness issue (even though a
defendant cannot waive his right to a fair trial)?221 Justice is best
served when the law is both specific and predictable.222
Equal treatment under the law, the goal of the Fourteenth
Amendment, suffers without certainty. One state's circus is another
state's solemn proceeding. The Murphy/Patton approach provides,
essentially, that if due process is violated, the trial is unfair.228 What
type of trial behavior constitutes a due process violation, however, is
left to the trial judge to decide. 24  A test this wide (in fact, it is so
clarification, the appellate court's duty is to elaborate the norms, by further declaring the law.
See id. at 229-39. Norm elaboration thus occurs when the court has the power to consider fully
a closely related series of situations involving a claim of constitutional privilege. See id. at 273.
218. See Scalia, supra note 28, at 1180 ("It is no more possible to demonstrate the
inconsistency of two opinions based upon a 'totality of the circumstances' test than it is to
demonstrate the inconsistency of two jury verdicts.").
219. See supra notes 118-32 and accompanying text (describing how Wilbert Rideau's 20-
minute confession to bank robbery, kidnapping, and murder was broadcast on television on
three separate occasions throughout local community to more than two-thirds of population).
220. Cf Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 536-52 (1965) (holding that televising of courtroom
proceedings in which there is widespread public interest likely to result in prejudice to accused
is violation of fundamental right to fair trial guaranteed by Due Process Clause of Fourteenth
Amendment); Douglas E. Mirell, O.J. Fallout IV The Wrong Remedy for Solving a Non-Problem, 1996
WL 87041 (O.J. Comm.) (listing proposed changes to California's rules governing photography,
radio, and television coverage of all state court proceedings). See generally PAUL THALER, THE
WATCHFUL EYE, AMERICAN JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF THE TELEVISED TRIAL (Prager 1994) (giving
history of age of televised trial and case study of televised Steinberg trial in 1988). Although the
law inevitably changes as technology changes or becomes more accepted, a standards-based
approach detracts from the predictability of that change by replacing the Rule of Law with the
Rule of Change. See Scalia, supra note 28, at 1187.
221. SeeStroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181,193-94 (1952) (upholding defendant's first-degree
murder conviction despite failure to request change of venue because public defenders saw no
need to transfer action on grounds that prejudicial newspaper accounts made it impossible for
fair trial); State v. Smart, 622 A.2d 1197, 1205 (N.H. 1993) (finding defendant satisfied with jury
at time of trial, reflected by his failure to exercise all peremptory challenges available).
222. See Stroble, 343 U.S. at 201 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
223. See supra notes 177-89 and accompanying text (discussing Murphy and Patton as two cases
finding due process violation and presumed prejudice when there is apparent and flagrant
departure from fundamental due process and decorum and intrusion of extreme influences).
224. See supra notes 177-89 and accompanying text (discussing holding in Murphy as permit-
tingjudge to use supervisory power to decide exactly when jurors' exposure to defendant's prior
convictions or to news accounts of alleged crime will constitute violation of constitutional rights
and discussing holding in Patton as allowing judge to use supervisory power to decide whether
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wide it is circular) leads to unequal results within a jurisdiction, and
among the jurisdictions.2 ' Moreover, standardization is unlikely to
occur considering the futility of appeal.226
One advantage of a totality of the circumstances test is its flexibili-
ty.221 Such an approach confers the greatest amount of discretion
on the trial judge because there is no bright-line rule limiting the
application of justice. 2 8 If a trial judge abuses that discretion, the
appellate review process works to cure the apparent arbitrariness,
encouraging overall judicial restraint.229 This argument relies on
the availability ofjudicial review to constrain lower court indiscretions.
The Murphy/Patton approach reveals, however, a structural
weakness. In Patton, the Court held that it would reverse a trial
court's finding of impartiality only in the event of plain error on the
part of the trial judge.2' The Court ignored substantial indicators
of juror bias apparent in the voir dire record.21  The Court gave
little justification for its analysis. 23 2 This oversight is strange because
the role of the Court under a totality of the circumstances approach
is to analyze the specific facts of the case.233 With no curative review
from the higher court, a lower court is not encouraged to exercise
judicial restraint,2M and arbitrariness, therefore, actually is encour-
aged.235
This approach not only fails to restrain the lower courts; it fails to
restrain the Supreme Court itself. With no established rule upon
which to base its decisions, the Court is less likely to adhere to the
governing principles behind the law and more likely to impose
arbitrary distinctions.2 36  Only by restricting itself with self-imposed
publicity concerning case had resulted in prejudicial information that could not be eradicated
from potential jurors minds).
225. See Scalia, supra note 28, at 1179 (noting that if every federal and state court were to
take "totality of circumstances" approach, there would be very little uniformity in law).
226. See i. at 1186 (noting that "totality of circumstances" approach to judicial decision-
making allows courts to grant judgment solely on circumstances of case, which will result in
opinions that lack guidance and law that lacks standardization).
227. See id. at 1177.
228. See d.
229. See id.
230. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1032 (1984).
231. See id. at 1031-35.
232. See i. at 1035 (citing Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975), and Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717 (1961), as basis for finding no presumption of partiality or prejudice existing at time
of initial trial or between two trials).
233. See Scalia, supra note 28, at 1180-81.
234. See id. at 1179.
235. See id. at 1180.
236. See id. at 1185.
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discipline in the form of a rule can the Court succeed in establishing
true rule of law.
2 7
A pretrial publicity "rule of law," will have the desired opposite
effect-it will provide a structured framework within which the law
can develop. Certainty, predictability, and clarity will result, giving
appellate courts an intellectually honest standard with which they can
evaluate claims of juror bias. Such a rule will moderate potentially
harmful exercises of judicial discretion by providing a common
guideline within which judges can tailor proactive approaches to
pretrial publicity problems.
III. CASE STUDIES: "NATIONALLY NOTORIOUS" TRIALS
A. "Tabloid" Crimes: State v. Smart
On May 1, 1990, Pamela Smart reported to police that she found
the dead body of her husband in their home, the apparent victim of
a homicide.2" The young couple had been married for less than
a year during which time Pamela Smart had worked at a local high
school.3 9 As the police investigated, a sordid story came to light.
The murderers, high school youths, bragged about committing the
murder to a friend, who informed the police." It became evident
that Smart had been involved in a sexual relationship with one of the
fifteen-year-old killers and had persuaded him to kill her hus-
band. 4' A jury found her guilty of first degree murder, conspiracy
to commit murder, and tampering with a witness. 42
Smart's arrest and trial immediately gained the attention of the
national media, which publicized the story at a level unprecedented
in New Hampshire's history.2" Smart appealed her conviction to
the New Hampshire Supreme Court, claiming that the trial court
erred in not granting her motion for change of venue and in not
237. See id. at 1184-85. Justice Scalia notes:
Just as that manner of textual exegesis facilitates the formulation of general rules, so
does, in the constitutional field, adherence to a more or less originalist theory of
construction....
It is, of course, possible to establish general rules, no matter what theory of interpre-
tation or construction one employs.... But when one does not have a solid textual
anchor or an established social norm from which to derive the general rule, its
pronouncement appears uncomfortably like legislation.
Id (footnote omitted).
238. See State v. Smart, 622 A.2d 1197, 1200 (N.H. 1993).
239. See id.
240. See id. at 1201.
241. See id. at 1200.
242. See id.
243. See id. at 1203-04.
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ordering a continuance.2 0 She based her claim on both the New
Hampshire and U.S. Constitutions, arguing that the publicity was so
pervasive and prejudicial that it was presumptively impossible to seat
an impartial jury.
245
The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the convictions.4
The court began its analysis by noting that the Constitution's
guarantee of a trial before a fair and impartial jury did not require a
trial before a jury ignorant of the facts and issues at trial.247  The
court noted that pretrial publicity can cause presumptive prejudice or
actual prejudice. 25  According to the court, presumptive prejudice
can be found only when the adverse pretrial publicity is of such a
nature that it creates a presumption of prejudice, and accordingly,
juror claims of impartiality cannot be believed.249 The court also
stated that a trial court's finding of juror impartiality should be
reviewed for manifest error.50
The court then analyzed the voir dire transcript and found that no
member of the jury had expressed the opinion that Smart was guilty
and that no juror sat on the jury over Smart's objection.25' Another
significant problem with Smart's claim concerned the nature of the
publicity. The court acknowledged that there was an "avalanche" of
pretrial publicity, and that some of it was hostile and accusatory
toward Smart, but found that the bulk of the material consisted of
"'straightforward, unemotional factual accounts of events. "'252 The
court also rejected Smart's contention that the jury's possible
exposure to evidence not presented at trial contaminated it, by
holding that "[e]xposure to inadmissible evidence... is not sufficient
244. See id. at 1202.
245. See id.
246. See id. at 1216.
247. See id. at 1203 (noting that "'it is not required... that the jurors be totally ignorant of
the facts and issues involved'" (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961))); see also
Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 303 (1977) (stating that "one who is reasonably suspected of
murdering [her husband] cannot expect to remain anonymous").
248. See Smart, 622 A.2d at 1202-03 (citing Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 (1984)).
249. See id.
250. See id. at 1203 (citing Patton, 467 U.S. at 1031-32). Although the state supreme court
applied the holding of Patton correctly, its statement of the current test reveals the circular
reasoning courts use in their analysis of pretrial publicity. Essentially, the court defined
presumptive prejudice as that which is presumptively prejudiced, reasoning that is not very
helpful in application. The definition provides no external guidelines to help determine which
publicity is prejudicial.
251. See id.
252. Id. at 1204 (finding no presumption of prejudice created by publicity about Watergate
defendants (quoting United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1976))).
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to presume jury prejudice."2 3  The fact that the jury was drawn
from a community exposed to intensive pretrial publicity resulting in
familiarity with the case was not enough to presume prejudice.2"
The court then examined the trial atmosphere using the totality of
the circumstances test developed in Sheppard255 to determine if
Smart "'was deprived of thatjudicial serenity and calm to which [she]
was entitled.'"25 6  Comparing the courtroom spectacle of Sheppard
to Smart's trial, the court held that the two were not similar.257 The
court stated that the judge at Smart's trial had instructed the press on
how to behave by barring pictures of the jurors, by limiting the
number of cameras in the courtroom, and by limiting the number of
seats available to the media.25s The appellate court also found that
the trial judge had given the jury explicit instructions to avoid all
publicity in relation to the trial, to avoid the press, and to report any
contacts made by the press to the sheriff.259 Finally, the appellate
court actually reviewed videotape of thirty hours of the trial to
determine whether the trial judge conducted the trial in the "calm,
dignified manner to which the defendant was entited."26°
Two problems undermine the New Hampshire Supreme Court's
approach. The first lies in the court's definition of "presumptively
prejudicial publicity" as that kind of publicity from which prejudice
can be presumed. 261 This circular definition indicates that the court
was unclear about the facts to be examined to determine whether
prejudice existed, and that the court did not understand the insidious
nature of publicity that can cause prejudice. These conclusions are
evidenced by the court's holding that juror exposure to inadmissible
253. Id.; see also Patton, 467 U.S. at 1027 (finding no presumption of prejudice despite news
articles reporting defendant's written confession even though confession was inadmissible at
trial); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 797-99 (1975) (finding no presumption of prejudice
despite juror exposure to news articles detailing defendant's prior convictions). But cf Rideau
v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726-27 (1963) (reversing conviction after inflammatory publication
of defendant's confession even though confession was introduced later at trial); Irvin v. Dowd,
366 U.S. 717, 726-27 (1961) (holding that inflammatory publication of confession later ruled
admissible at trial is one factor to be considered when reversing due to jury impartiality);
Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 313 (1959) (using supervisory power over federal courts
to reverse conviction after juror exposure to inadmissible evidence).
254. See Smart, 622 A.2d at 1205.
255. See id. at 1207-09 (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 355 (1966)).
256. Id. at 1207 (quoting Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 355).
257. See id. at 1216.
258. See id. at 1207-08.
259. See id. at 1208.
260. Id. at 1209.
261. See id. at 1203.
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evidence alone is not enough to create a presumption of preju-
dice.262
This holding does not give any clear guidance as to the nature and
scope of potentially prejudicial publicity that will create a presumption
of prejudice.263 Without stating the indicia of impartiality that are
sufficient to overcome a presumption of impartiality, the New




In addition, post-Murphy appellate courts will review the voir dire
record as the primary tool for determining whether the jury was
indeed prejudiced.2" The problem with this approach is that it is
unlikely to give an accurate portrayal of the real level of juror bias.
Jurors often have no idea of their biases, and even if they do, they are
often unwilling to admit them to the trial judge.266  Following
Mu'Min v. Virginia," judges are not constitutionally required to
allow defendants to inquire into the content of publicity to which
jurors have been exposed, thereby making the jurors' own assertions
of impartiality dispositive.2  In most cases, this precludes any
further inquiry.
B. "Heinous" Crimes: People v. Manson
In 1969, the Manson "family ' made international headlines
for the Tate-LaBianca murders it committed under the direction
of Charles Manson.269 Manson was charged with seven counts of
first-degree murder and one count of conspiracy to commit murder
for his role in the killings.2 0  The victims were well known in Los
Angeles, and their violent, gruesome deaths gave the Manson cult
instant notoriety.271 A California jury convicted Manson on all
262. See id. at 1205 ("The jury voir dire.., demonstrates that specific reference to the
defendant's case in the (jury service] notice to prospective jurors was not prejudicial and may
even have had a salutary effect.").
263. See id.
264. See id. (stating that adverse nature of publicity and not merely its quantity is critical in
finding presumptive prejudice).
265. See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 803 (1975) (finding that petitioner received fair
trial after applying "totality of circumstances" test to conclude that fact that 20 venire persons
of 78 were excluded did not suggest community sentiment poised against petitioner).
266. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
267. 500 U.S. 415 (1991).
268. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991).
269. See People v. Manson, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265, 275 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1976).
270. See id. at 274.
271. See id. at 275-76. Sharon Tate Polanski, a well-known actress, was one of the victims,
along with four others present at her home. One victim was shot to death in his car, two were
found on the lawn, and two were found in the house, tied together. The killers had shot and
stabbed the victims numerous times, spraying blood throughout the premises. The word "Pig"
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counts.272 The California Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that
neither a change of venue nor a continuance would have affected the
outcome of the trial because the publicity permeated the entire state
and was not likely to subside, even with a continuance.
2 73
The California Court of Appeals began its analysis by stating that it
had the duty to make an independent examination of the facts to
determine if Manson had been granted a fair trial. 4  It then
applied the two-part Murphy test275 by first examining whether the
trial court had allowed any "apparent and flagrant departure from
fundamental due process and decorum and an intrusion of external
influences" that would raise a presumption of prejudice.276  The
appellate court noted that the trial judge had excluded a single
prospective juror who had read about one of the defendant's
confessions,277 and that there was no evidence that any of the seated
jurors knew that any of the defendants had confessed. Moreover,
the Manson jury was sequestered throughout the trial,279 and the
trial judge strictly controlled the media during the trial.2 °
was written in blood on the front door. At the LaBianca murder scene, the victims' son found
the victims' hands tied behind their backs and bloody pillowcases over their heads. Mrs.
LaBianca had been stabbed 41 times, and Mr. LaBianca had a carving fork protruding from his
stomach and another knife protruding from his neck. On his stomach was carved the word
"War." "Death to the Pigs," "Rise," and "Helter Skelter" were written in blood throughout the
house. See id. at 275-76.
272. See id. at 274.
273. See id. at 310. In its analysis of whether a change of venue would have been appropri-
ate, the appellate court made "general acknowledgment that adversities ofpublicity are consider-
ably offset if trial is conducted in a populous metropolitan area." Id. at 317.
274. See id. at 315 ("'(G] iven the pervasiveness of modern communications and the difficulty
of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors (that) trial courts must take strong
measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the accused. And appellate
tribunals have the duty to make an independent evaluation of the circumstances."' (quoting
People v. Sirhan, 497 P.2d 1121, 1134 (1972))).
275. See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799-81 (1974) (defining first part of test as
deviation from due process to such degree that presumptively deprives defendant of fair trial
and second part of test as totality of circumstances approach examining record and court's voir
dire for signs of actual juror prejudice).
The review of the court's voir dire examination considers the general community atmosphere
at the time of the trial, and although not requiring that jurors be ignorant of facts and circum-
stances of the crime, the process must selectjurors sufficiently impartial and indifferent to the
crime to satisfy constitutional standards of fairness. See id. at 799-800.






In holding the "presumed prejudice" test inapplicable,2 ' the
appellate court applied the second half of the Murphy test282 by
examining the totality of the circumstances of the voir dire record,
the courtroom and community atmosphere, and the measures that
the trial court took to select an impartial jury.,83 On review, the
voir dire record revealed that the venire had a general familiarity with
the case, but that less than one-fourth of the entire pool of potential
jurors admitted to any disqualifying prejudices.2" The appellate
court noted with approval the trial court's use of gag orders on trial
participants,juror admonishments, and a security order regulating the
media,285 concluding that Manson received a fair and impartial
trial.
286
Manson was the first case in which a California state appellate court
applied the test developed in Murphy.2s7 There can be no doubt
that the trial judge took great pains to neutralize the effects of
publicity.288 The appellate court was correct when it applied the
first half of the Murphy test, the "decorum test," to the Manson facts.
Manson was different from the Irvin line of cases in that there were no
apparent transgressions by the state authorities throughout the
proceedings that could raise a presumption that the trial was
281. See id. (distinguishing Manson from cases in which appellate court found pretrial
publicity presumptively prejudicial by citing lower court's restraint and dignity during pretrial
and trial proceedings).
282. See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975).
283. See Manson, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
284. See id. at 317. Compare Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S 717, 727 (1961) (finding that 90% of
potential jurors had disqualifying prejudices), with Manson, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 316-17 (approving
of trial court's voir dire techniques, which included individual questioning of each potential
juror and interrogation with respect to publicity by defendant's counsel).
285. See Manson, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 315, 319.
286. See id. at 319. As in State v. Smart, 622 A.2d 1197 (N.H. 1993), the appellate court
noted, "The fact that a case receives enormous publicity does not by itself establish error nor
does conceded 'massive' publicity automatically translate into prejudice." Id. Smart is indicative
of those cases that are essentially local in nature but that take on national notoriety due to facts
such as taboo sex, gruesome murder, or cases involving celebrities. Other examples are the
assault and mutilation trial of abused wife Lorena Bobbitt for cutting off her husband's penis,
and the sexual assault trial of boxer Mike Tyson.
287. See Constance M. Jones, Appellate Review of Criminal Change of Venue Rulings: The Demise
of California's Reasonable Likelihood Standard, 71 CAL. L. REV. 703, 715-16 (1983) (arguing that
Manson appellate court incorrectly equated state "reasonable likelihood" standard derived from
Maine v. Superior Court, 438 P.2d 372 (Cal. App. Ct. 1968), with federal "totality of the
circumstances" standard in Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1974)).
288. See Manson, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 316 n.82 (conducting individual voir dire on jurors to rule
out potential prejudicial effect ofManson co-appellant's courtroom outbursts that tauntedjurors
to find them guilty based on media coverage).
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unfair 28 9 The trial judge's strict orders over trial participants and
the press ensured this result.2°°
However, when the appellate court examined the voir dire record
to determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the
trial had been fair, it made generalizations about the character of the
venire as a whole. 91 Under this analysis, because the majority of
the venire stated that they were impartial, the court found that the
jury itself must have been impartial.292
This forced generalization, inherent in the Murphy test, does not
answer the difficult question of who is an impartial juror. Likewise,
it gives little certainty to the law. The trial judge applied certain
remedial measures that were approved by the appellate court, but
does such action mean that the next judge must use those same
measures? Under the "totality of the circumstances" it is difficult to
determine which facts are conclusive in determining impartiality.
C. The Famous Defendant: United States v. Hearst
In 1974 a federal grand jury indicted Patricia Hearst for armed
bank robbery and for using a firearm to commit a felony.
293
Although earlier in the year members of the Symbionese Liberation
Army had kidnapped her at gunpoint, two months after her kidnap-
ping she released a tape renouncing her former lifestyle and vowing
to stay and fight beside her captors.2 Shortly thereafter, she
participated in the armed bank robbery, during which bystanders were
wounded, and in a shoplifting incident, during which she covered her
comrades' escape by spraying a store with semi-automatic weapons
fire.29
5
289. CompareEstes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 550-51 (1965) (finding prejudice when courtroom
demeanor was lost due to mass of cameras, microphones, and reporters in courtroom); Irvin,
366 U.S. at 725 (finding prejudice by overwhelming impact of defendant's publicized offer to
plead guilty and his publicized confessions to several murders and burglaries); Turner v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 473 (1965) (finding presumptive prejudice when key prosecution
wimess served asjury shepherd during trial); and Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 727 (1963)
(finding prejudice when local television station broadcast live pretrial coverage of defendant's
confession), with Manson, 61 Cal. App. 3d at 185-86 (finding that absence of these transgressions
and court's jury sequestration and limited jury press exposure ensured fair trial).
290. See Manson, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
291. See id. at 316-17 (discussing biases ofjury panel).
292. See id. at 317 (noting that small percentage ofjury panel indicating bias against Manson
defendants was not "appreciable hostility").
293. SeeUnited States v. Hearst, 466 F. Supp. 1068, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 1978), affd in part, denied
in part, 638 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1980).
294. See id.
295. See id.
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Before her eight-week trial, the judge allowed extensive in camera
voir dire,29 after which -the jury remained sequestered. 97 After
the jury found her guilty and the court sentenced her to seven years
in prison, Hearst made two motions for a new trial and then appealed
her conviction.98 In her first two appeals, Hearst challenged
evidentiary rulings made by the trial court, but did not claim that her
trial was prejudiced by pretrial publicity.2  The court of appeals
affirmed her conviction, 30° and the Supreme Court denied her
petition for a writ of certiorari.5 0' With new counsel, Hearst then
moved the district court for an order vacating her sentence or,
alternatively, for an order reducing her sentence, claiming she had
received an unfair trial. 2 Among other claims, she asserted that
the massive pretrial publicity had made it impossible to pick an
impartial jury, which led to the presumption that her trial was
unfair.3 3 The court denied her motion, finding that she had
received a fair trial."'
The district court began its analysis of Hearst's motion by stating
that her failure to raise the pretrial publicity issue at trial or on appeal
precluded relitigation of the issue in a new trial. 05 Accordingly,
Hearst should have requested a change of venue prior to her trial,
which would have enabled the trial judge to assess the impact of news
296. See id. The trial judge examined the jurors individually, in camera, and out of the view
of the rest of the venire, the public, and the press. The defense submitted 75 questions, of
which the judge used almost all in his voir dire. The judge also allowed the defense to submit
additional questions. Thejudge asked the jurors about their reading habits, television and radio
exposure to the story, and recollection of the events at trial. The judge also asked about
conversations the jurors had had with family and friends about the issues at trial. See id. at 1076-
77. The voir dire took nearly a week, and nearly 60 potentialjurors were called. See id. at 1071.
297. See id.
298. See id at 1072; United States v. Hearst, 435 F. Supp. 29, 31 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (denying
motion for reconsideration of new trial due to untimely filing); United States v. Hearst, 424 F.
Supp. 307, 318 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (denying motion for new trial on ground government did not
constitutionally deprive Hearst of exculpatory evidence).
299. See Hearst, 424 F. Supp. at 309.
300. See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977) (affirming trial court
conviction and affirming District Court denial of new trial and reconsideration of new trial
motions).
301. See United States v. Hearst, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978).
302. See Hearst, 466 F. Supp. at 1072-73 (making renewed unsuccessful appellate challenge
on grounds of pretrial publicity prejudice).
303. See id.
304. See id. at 1088.
305. See id. at 1074. The court reasoned that Hearst should have moved for a change of
venue and that her failure to do so constituted a waiver under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. See id. (citing FED. R. CriM. P. 12(b), (f)). The purpose of the waiver, the court
found, is to ensure that constitutional defects that can be remedied at trial are not used
subsequently by the defense as a purely tactical measure to overturn a guilty verdict and essen-
tially to void the proceedings. See id. at 1074-75.
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coverage to her trial." 6 As Hearst had made no such request, the
trial judge had proceeded in its voir dire and had allowed the trial to
continue.3
07
The court did, however, analyze the merits of Hearst's claim, stating
that she submitted no evidence sufficient to show actual juror
prejudice." Although she did submit evidence of extensive publici-
ty throughout the United States, the court reasoned that it would be
speculation to conclude that the evidence was proof of an unfair
trial."° Furthermore, the national attention the trial received made
it unlikely that any jurisdiction would be unfamiliar with the story,
thus obviating the need for a change of venue at the original
trial.310 The trial court also used a rigorous voir dire to ensure that
the jury seated was not prejudiced."' Finally, the court rejected the
contention that the atmosphere of the proceedings made the trial
unconstitutionally unfair.3 12 The location of the press box during
the trial, judicial remarks about the bank robbery, and juror aware-
ness of extraneous, prejudicial information were found to be
"insignificant details" when considered cumulatively.
313
D. The Famous Victim. People v. Sirhan
In 1968, ajury in a California state court found Sirhan Sirhan guilty
of assassinating Senator Robert E Kennedy and sentenced him to
death. 4 After sentencing, Sirhan moved for a new trial, contend-
ing that he had been denied a fair trial as a result of pretrial publicity
and that certain evidence had been admitted improperly.3 15  The
trial court denied the motion, and the California supreme court
heard the automatic appeal. 16 The supreme court overturned the
death penalty sentence as cruel and unusual punishment, but upheld
the conviction and sentenced Sirhan to life imprisonment 
31 7
306. See id. at 1075.
307. See id.
308. See id. at 1076.
309. See id. Hearst submitted newspaper clippings from three major cities and argued that
because coverage was heavier in San Francisco where the trial was held, one of the other cities
would have offered a better opportunity to find an impartial jury. See id
310. See id.
311. See id. (citing Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 638-39 (9th Cir. 1968)).
312. See id. at 1076-77.
313. See id. at 1077.
314. See People v. Sirhan, 497 P.2d 1121, 1124 (Cal. 1972).
315. See id. at 1124-25.
316. See id. at 1124.
317. See id. at 1125 (explaining that after Sirhan's trial, but before California supreme court
heard Sirhan's case, supreme court of California held in People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 883
(Cal. 1972), that capital punishment violated California's constitutional provision against cruel
or unusual punishment).
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The California supreme court found that before the trial, the jury
was sworn but not sequestered."' The trial judge did admonish
them, however, to avoid any publicity about the trial. 9 Subsequent-
ly, Sirhan made a motion in chambers to enter a guilty plea to first-
degree murder in return for life imprisonment, which the court
denied.32 The press learned about the attempt to plead guilty, and
covered it in numerous newspaper articles and in radio and television
broadcasts. 2 Sirhan then moved for a mistrial on account of the
publication of his attempted plea, which the judge also denied after
questioning the jurors individually about their exposure to the
publicity.22 The judge found that practically all of the jurors stated
that they could set aside anything they had heard or read and could
decide the case solely on the evidence presented at trial.
323
The California supreme court held that the record did not show
actual or probable prejudice even if the jurors were unable to
disregard what they had read or heard.3 24 At trial defense counsel
made it dear to the jury that they were not seeking an acquittal, but
that the issue was whether Sirhan was guilty of first-degree murder or
of a lesser offense. 3' Thus, the supreme court found the publicity
to be consistent with the evidence heard at trial.326 The California
supreme court compared Rideau,327 in which the Supreme Court
overturned a conviction after the press had broadcast repeatedly the
defendant's confession,328 and stated that in Sirhan's case the
318. See id. at 1133.
319. See id.
320. See id.
321. See idi The California supreme court cited stories in the Los Angees Times stating that
there had been discussion in chambers among the judge and the defense and prosecution
lawyers, and that a plea arrangement had been discussed. See id, The court also acknowledged
radio broadcasts that had discussed the probability of Sirhan pleading guilty to avoid the death
penalty. See id
322. See id at 1134. At least four jurors had read the Los Angeles Times' headlines, had heard
on television or radio that Sirhan was pleading guilty, or had talked to acquaintances who had
heard the broadcasts. See id. Otherjurors indicated that they had heard statements suggesting
that Sirhan was pleading guilty to first degree murder. See id. at 1134 n.8.
323. See id. at 1134.
324. See id.
325. See id. at 1135.
326. See id Sirhan's counsel had made it clear to the jurors during voir dire that they were
"not seeking an acquittal, but that they had to determine whether it was murder in the first
degree, murder in the second degree or manslaughter, that's the only issue." Id. at 1135 n.10.
During closing arguments, defense counsel again stated that the issue was not one of guilt, but
whether Sirhan was guilty of first degree murder. See id Furthermore, during cross-examina-
tion, Sirhan admitted to having stated, "I killed Robert Kennedy willfully, premeditatively, with
twenty years of malice aforethought." IML at 1135.
327. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 727 (1963).
328. See id. (finding due process violation in not granting venue change when local television
station broadcast 20-minute confession prior to jury selection).
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publicity had a less damaging impact on the jurors.329 Because the
news stories were consistent with the evidence, the trial was not "but
a hollow formality.
330
IV. PROPOSED REMEDIAL MEASURES TO NEUTRALIZE THE
PREJUDICIAL EFFECTS OF PRETRIAL PuBLIcITY
A. Restraining the Press
Restraining the press from publishing details of a crime, investiga-
tion, and judicial proceedings is presumptively unconstitutional. 3'
In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,"2 the Supreme Court directly
considered this issue in the context of a state trial court's order
temporarily restricting publication of details prejudicial to the
defendant 33  The order restricted publication of accounts of the
defendant's confession, as well as of the identity of the victims334 in
an effort to ensure the fairness of what was sure to be a "sensational"
murder trial in a small Nebraska town.335
Noting that "prior restraints" on the press were the evils the First
Amendment drafters desired to remedy, 36 the Court stated that
prior restraints bear an initial presumption of unconstitutionality.
3 7
To determine whether the presumption was rebutted, the Court
examined: "(a) the nature and extent of pretrial news coverage; (b)
whether other measures would be likely to mitigate the effects of
unrestrained pretrial publicity; and (c) how effectively a restraining
order would operate to prevent the threatened danger."3' The
Court held the restrictive order unconstitutional.3 9 The concurring
Justices opined that they doubted whether a prior restraint would ever
329. See Sirhan, 497 P.2d at 1135-36.
330. Id. at 1136 (quoting Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726).
331. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 566-60 (1976); see also Landmark
Comms. Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 846 (1978); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE, FAIR
TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 21-34 (3d ed. 1992) (discussing press' increased First Amendment rights
of access in light of Supreme Court decisions following Nebraska Press Ass'n).
332. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
333. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 543.
334. See id. at 543-44. The order applied only until the jury was impaneled, and prohibited
the publication of the existence or content of any confessions or statements made by the
defendant to other persons, of notes written by the defendant, of details of medical testimony,
and of the identity of the victims. See id.
335. See id. at 542. The defendant, Erwin Simants, was convicted and sentenced to death for
the murders of six members of a family in a rural Nebraska town. See id. at 546. He murdered
the victims during the commission of a sexual assault. See id. at 542, 546.
336. See id. at 556.
337. See id. at 559.
338. Id. at 562.
339. See id. at 570.
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pass constitutional muster, thus making it unlikely that a current
Court would sustain a restrictive gag order under constitutional
attack.~S
B. Restraining Lawyers
The limits imposed by Nebraska Press Assn' may result in the
increasing use of restraining orders on those under the court's
control, especially the parties' attorneys. As Nebraska Press Ass'n makes
it virtually impossible for a court to combat pretrial publicity through
prior restraints on the press, a court's alternative is to limit what the
parties' attorneys may say to the press. This can be accomplished
through strict enforcement of attorney ethics rules restricting
extrajudicial statements by attorneys. 1 Orders silencing attorneys
will be upheld, however, only if an attorney's statements cause a
substantial likelihood of material prejudice to the proceeding. This
"substantial likelihood" test is the result of Gentile v. State Bar of
Nevada.34 2
Attorney Dominic P. Gentile held a press conference several hours
after his client's indictment in Nevada.' 4 Gentile outlined his
client's defense, stated that Nevada sought the conviction of an
innocent man as a "scapegoat," accused the state of being dishonest,
and called the police officers "crooked."' 4  A jury subsequently
acquitted Gentile's client."
340. See id. at 570-71 (White,J., concurring) ("MThere is grave doubt in my mind whether
orders with respect to the press such as were entered in this case would ever be justifiable."); id.
at 571; (Powell,J., concurring) ("In myjudgment a prior restraint properly may issue only when
it is shown to be necessary to prevent the dissemination of prejudicial publicity that otherwise
poses a high likelihood of preventing, directly and irreparably, the impaneling of ajury meeting
the Sixth Amendment requirement of impartiality."); id. at 612 (Brennan, J., concurring)
("There is ... clear and substantial damage to freedom of the press whenever a temporary
restraint is imposed on reporting of material concerning the operations of the criminal justice
system ... ").
341. SeABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.6 (1995) (prohibiting lawyer from
making public commentary when lawyer knows or should know information would have
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing adjudicative proceeding and approving release
of specific information including claim, offense, information in public record, and result of any
step of litigation).
342. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991); see also Ronald D. Rotunda, Can You Say That?, 30 TRIAL MAC.,
Dec. 1994, at 18 (discussing ABA's amendments to Rule 3.6 and general reaction to Gentile).
Several lower courts anticipated that some state ethics rules raised First Amendment problems.
See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 856, 869 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (concluding that prior
restraint is predetermined judicial prohibition on speech that cannot constitute subject of
litigation in disciplinary proceeding against attorney); Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522
F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975).
348. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1033 (1991).
344. Id at 1034.
345. See id. at 1033.
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The Nevada State Bar then filed a complaint, claiming that Gentile
had violated Nevada's Supreme Court Rule 17 7,16 which governs
pretrial publicity.347 Rule 177(1) prohibits a lawyer from making
"an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to
be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer
knows ... that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding."' Following a hearing, the
Disciplinary Board of the Nevada State Bar found that Gentile's
comments violated Rule 177.1" The board recommended a private
reprimand. Gentile appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court, which
affirmed the decision of the board, and Gentile then appealed to the
Supreme Court.5° Chief Justice Rehnquist's portion of the opinion
approved Rule 177's general test, prohibiting lawyers from publicly





This rule, like ABA Model Rule 3.6,52 allows an attorney to state
publicly what already is contained in a public record. 3  This
"public record exception" is an important exception due to the nature
of indictments and pleadings. An indictment, which is a public
record, need not be limited to bare facts. In it, the prosecution may
tell a story by describing the alleged 'crime and what unindicted co-
conspirators might have said or done, and so forth . 54 Likewise, the
defense counsel may file pleadings and other papers with the court
that tell the story from the defendant's perspective.355 These
detailed stories, allegations, and explanations become part of the
public record that an attorney may reveal.35 6
The result of Gentile is that it is harder for attorneys to use publicity
tactics to sway public opinion in their client's favor, but it is not
impossible. Attorneys still may make public comments about their
346. Nv. ST. S. CT. R.P.C. 177(l)-(2) (a).
347. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1033.
348. Nv. ST. S. Or. R.P.C. 177(1)-(2) (a).
349. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1033.
350. See id.
351. See id. at 1062-63.
352. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCF RULE 3.6 (1995).
353. SeeNv. ST. S. Cr. R.P.C. 177(l)-(2) (a); seealsoMODELRULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCF
RULE 3.6 (1995); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE 8-1.1 (modifyingABA standard 1.1 regarding
extrajudicial statements by attorneys in criminal proceedings by adopting "substantial likelihood"
test of Model Rule 3.6).
354. See Gentie, 501 U.S. at 1056 (recognizing government officials' power in pretrial
information release).
355. SeeJoel H. Swift, Model Rule 3.6: An Unconstitutional Regulation of Defense Attorney Trial
Publicity, 64 B.U. L. REv. 1003, 1031-39 (1984) (questioning need for restrictions on defense
publicity).
356. See Gentie, 501 U.S. at 1056.
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case and justify the comments by arguing the public record exception.
In addition, the disciplinary rules from which the Gentile standard was
developed apply to lawyers. Other people involved in a case, such as
the police, are not affected by Gentile though they may be controlled
by their own ethical standards.
C. Closure ofJudicial Proceedings
1. Closure of pretrial proceedings
At times, courts have sought to close portions of proceedings to the
public in an effort to control pretrial publicity. 7 Such tactics are
intended to stop the press from gaining access to the proceedings,
which curtails their efforts to publish potentially prejudicial informa-
tion. In Gannet Co. v. DePasquale,38 the Supreme Court upheld this
practice under the narrow circumstances of that case.359 The Court
held, by a five to four vote,3" that neither the public nor the press
has an independent constitutional right to insist on access to a
pretrial suppression hearing if the accused, the prosecutor, and the
trial judge all agree that the proceeding should be closed to ensure
a fair trial.36
Gannet, however, must be read narrowly. The majority opinion
emphasized that the denial of public access was temporary, because
the trial court did make a transcript of the suppression hearing
available once the danger of pretrial publicity had passed.362
Throughout its opinion, the majority concentrated on the dangers of
pretrial publicity in that particular case.363 Three of the five-
member majority wrote separate concurring opinions." Chief
357. See Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 98 (1979) (favoring newspaper's First
Amendment right to publish information lawfully obtained from police scanner and eyewimess
accounts, including name of juvenile, over state interest in protecting juvenile); Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829,849 (1978) (overrulingVirginia Supreme Court
ruling criminalizing release of otherwise truthful information when petitioner newspaper was
convicted for publishing story concerning pending disciplinary commission review of judge's
conduct).
358. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
359. See Gannet Co. v. DePasquae, 443 U.S. 368, 394 (1978).
360. See id. at 370. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined by
Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens. ChiefJustice Burger, andJustices Powell and Rehnquist
filed concurring opinions. Justice Blackmun filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part, and was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White.
361. See id.
362. See id. at 392-93.
363. See id. at 370-94.
364. See id. at 394 (Burger, CJ., concurring); id. at 397 (Powel4 J., concurring); id. at 403
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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Justice Burger emphasized that what was involved was "not a tria4 it
was a pretrial hearing.
"s
Additionally, the scope of Gannett's holding was unclear. Initially,
the majority distinguished between pretrial proceedings and the
actual trial, stating that pretrial publicity could have a prejudicial
effect on potential jurors and that the Sixth Amendment did not
grant the public the right to attend pretrial hearings."s However,
in its holding the majority abandoned the distinction between pretrial
and trial proceedings 67  Later in Richmond Newspapers v. Virgin-
ia," the Court limited its holding to pretrial proceedings.
The media criticized Gannett for leading to courtroom closures
throughout the nation without regard for the public interest. 69
Gannett has not been met with a warm reception in at least one
jurisdiction. In New York Times v. Demakos,70 the court addressed
the issue of media access to plea proceedings and determined that the
media should be allowed access to them. The court stated that closed
proceedings were permissible only in rare instances in which the
defendant presented clear and compelling evidence for closure."' 1
2. Closure of voir dire proceedings
Gannet notwithstanding, the Supreme Court consistently has noted
a presumption in favor of open legal proceedings. 72 Once faced
with a widely-publicized trial, the trial judge may wish to impose a ban
on media coverage to limit the venire's exposure to potentially
influential information.37 Given the presumption of openness,
however, a party petitioning to close pretrial voir dire has a high
burden to meet to succeed. 74
365. Id. at 394 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
366. See id.
367. See id. at 391.
368. 448 U.S. 555, 575-81 (1980).
369. See Richard M. Schmidt, Jr., The Gannett Decision: A Contradiction Wrapped in an
Obfuscation Inside an Enigma, THE JUDGE'SJ. 13 (Fall 1979).
370. 529 N.Y.S.2d 97 (App. Div. 1988).
371. See New York Times v. Demakos, 592 N.Y.S. 2d 97, 100 (App. Div. 1988).
372. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) (referring to public' trial as benefit
conferred on defendant to ensure fair treatment, as means by which to encourage witnesses to
come forward, and as method of discouraging perjury (citing Ganne 443 U.S. at 380; In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.24 (1948)); see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S.
596, 606 (1986) (noting that state justification in denying access to press and public must be
"weighty").
373. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) ("This court has frequently
denied that First Amendment rights are absolute and has consistently rejected the proposition
that a prior restraint can never be employed.").
374. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984) (establishing
presumption of openness that "may be overcome only by overriding interest based on findings
that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest").
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The test for closed voir dire, as established in Press Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court,"75 requires "an overriding interest that is likely to be
prejudiced [by an open proceeding], the closure must be no broader
than necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must consider
reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make
findings adequate to support the closure." 76 In applying the Press
Enterprise test, a court considers the petitioning party's interest in
protecting the privacy of individuals not before the court and how
carefully this interest can be accommodated without sacrificing the
Sixth Amendment guarantee of a fair trial.377 A petitioning party
must demonstrate with specificity the privacy interest to be protected,
how the interest would be infringed, what evidence would infringe the
interest, and what percentage of the overall evidence is objection-
able." Without the requisite showing of these factors, a petitioning
party is unlikely to meet the closure test.379
3. Trial closure
A narrow interpretation limiting Gannet to pretrial proceedings is
supported by the decision in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.8 0
A fragmented plurality of the Supreme Court, with only Justice
Rehnquist dissenting, rejected the asserted power of a state judge to
close a criminal trial.3 ' In Richmond Newspapers, the trial judge
relied on a state statute that granted broad discretion for trial closure
and that had received the consent of the prosecutor and the defen-
dant.
82
ChiefJustice Burgerjoined by justices White and Stevens, relied on
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to give the public the right of
access to criminal trials.m Specifically, the Court found that there
is a "presumption of openness" in all criminal trials" and that
375. 464 U.S. 501 (1994).
376. Wailer, 467 U.S. at 48 (citing Press Enterprise test).
377. See id.
378. See id.
379. See id. at 48-49.
380. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
381. SeeRichmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,581 (1980) (plurality opinion).
ChiefJustice Burger filed an opinion for the Court and wasjoined byJustices White and Stevens.
See id. at 558. Justice Brennan filed an opinion concurring in the judgment and was joined by
Justice Marshall. See id at 584.
382. See id. at 560.
383. See id. at 558.
384. See id. at 573.
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"[a] bsent an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a
criminal case must be open to the public."
38
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in the
judgment, but did not join in the opinion, although he did not
appear to disagree with any of it."6 Justice Brennan noted that
mere agreement of the trial judge and the parties cannot constitution-
ally close a trial to the public in light of the First Amendment guaran-
tees.3 7 Justice Stewart, concurring in the judgment, also relied on
a First Amendment right of access. 8 Justice Blackmun, concurring
in the judgment, relied principally on the Sixth Amendment, but also
acknowledged the First Amendment as the source of a right to
access.3
89
In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court," the Court elaborated on
the meaning of Richmond Newspapers and produced a majority opinion
while invalidating a state statute that required trial judges to exclude
the press and the public from the courtroom during the testimony of
the victim in cases involving certain specified sexual offenses."'
The Court left open the possibility that in certain cases the trial court
could exclude the press and the public during the testimony of minor
victims of sex crimes. 92
Justice Brennan explained that under Richmond Newspapers the First
Amendment grants to the press and to the general public "a right of
access to criminal trials"393 because historically such trials have been
open, and such openness aids in the functioning of the judicial
process and of the government as a whole. 9 The Court then
adopted a strict scrutiny test to determine whether closure of the
courtroom merits constitutional mandates. 395  Under the Globe
Newspaper rule, states may deny access only if denial serves "a
compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve
385. Id. at 581 (Stevens, J., concurring). This case was the first in which the Court found
constitutional protection for a right ofaccess-the right to acquire newsworthy information. See
id. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring).
386. See id. at 584 (Brennan,J., concurring).
387. See id. at 598 (Stewart, J., concurring).
388. See id. at 599 (StewartJ, concurring).
389. See id. at 603-04 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
390. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
391. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 598, 611 (1982).
392. See id. at 609. The Court suggested a "totality of the circumstances" approach, stating
that "among the factors to be weighed are the minor victim's age, psychological maturity and
understanding, the nature of the crime, the desires of the victim, and the interests of parents
and relatives." Id. at 608.
393. Id. at 604-05.
394. See id. at 607-08.
395. See id. at 607.
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that interest." 9' The Court rejected the state's mandatory closure
rule for not serving a compelling interest and for not being narrowly
tailored 97
CONCLUSION
This Article proposes the adoption of a specific constitutional
standard that clearly sets forth procedures that must be applied by a
court in a criminal case of national notoriety.
That a judicial, or even a constitutional standard might include
relatively specific directions is not, of course, without precedent. In
the well known case of Miranda v. Arizona, 98 for example, the
Supreme Court replaced a body of ad hoc constitutional decisions
applying the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination with
a set of precise procedural directives, which if followed, would ensure
a finding of voluntariness. Under Miranda, a violation of these
directives would, absent the promulgation by Congress or the States
of directives deemed by the Court to be equally effective in ensuring
voluntariness of a confession, require a finding of violation of the
privilege against self-incrimination.
In Miranda, the Court expressed dissatisfaction with applications of
vague standards of voluntariness in Fifth Amendment cases.3 All
such decisions were ad hoc in the sense that each trial court reviewed
the circumstances in a particular case and then made a subjective
assessment as to whether a particular statement or confession was
"voluntary." At the time of the Court's decision in Miranda, the Fifth
Amendment standard for compulsion still was based on the holding
of an 1897 case: "[T] he proof... must be adequate to establish that
the making of the statement was voluntary."' The standard's
subjective factor was not reduced appreciably by Justice Brandeis'
1924 announcement in Wan v. United States4 1 that "a confession is
voluntary in law if, and only if, it was, in fact, voluntarily made."
402
The result of these ad hoc applications of a vague general standard
was, according to the Court in Miranda, a "process of in-custody
interrogation ... [that] contains inherently compelling pressures
396. hIL
397. See id. at 607-08 (reasoning that mandatory closure rule could prohibit publication in
cases in which juvenile's name already is in public record or in which juvenile or parents make
no request for closure).
398. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
399. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
400. Brarn v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 549 (1897).
401. 266 U.S. 1 (1924).
402. Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14 (1924).
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which work to undermine the individual's will to resist,"4°3 and
therefore was a failure to protect the privilege. In other words, ad
hoc enforcement of a general standard of voluntariness had not been
adequate to ensure enforcement of the privilege.
The problem of ad hoc enforcement of Fifth Amendment standards
faced by the Court in Miranda is analogous to the problem facing the
courts today in the ad hoc enforcement of the right to a fair trial in
cases of national publicity and notoriety. Prior to Miranda, courts
adjudicating claims of denial of the privilege against self-incrimination
subjectively applied the general voluntariness standard.4 ' In the
same way, courts enforcing the constitutional right to a fair trial in
cases of national notoriety enforce similarly vague and subjective
standards, such as a determination of whether the "totality of the
circumstances" are such as to render the trial "fundamentally
unfair,"05 or of whether pretrial publicity "involves such a probabili-
ty that prejudice will result that it is deemed inherently lacking in due
process. 405
After Miranda, courts were required to apply the simple, though
relatively objective and specific, procedures set forth by the
Court-namely to advise a suspect in custody of (1) the right to
remain silent; (2) that anything said can be used against her in a
court of law; (3) the right to have an attorney present; and (4) the
right, if indigent, to have an attorney appointed.0 7 The Miranda
Court concluded that only by the creation of such specific guidelines
and directives could the privilege against self-incrimination be applied
uniformly in a meaningful way.408
Similarly, it is submitted in this Article that a defendant's right to
a fair trial in cases of national notoriety can be protected in a
meaningful way only by the promulgation of the following simple,
although relatively objective and specific, procedures, which if
followed, would, as in the case of Fifth Amendment privilege, be
presumed to satisfy the requirements of fairness:
I. A case shall be certified as a case of national notoriety if it is
one in which there is pervasive and continuous national media
treatment in newspapers and magazines, radio, and television, or
any other mass medium. In addition to considering the actual
403. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
404. See id. at 506-08 (Harlan,J., dissenting) (noting that federal courts used voluntariness
'in fact' as test of admissability).
405. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794; 799 (1975).
406. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1965).
407. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79.
408. See id. at 467.
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extent of media attention, the following factors shall be considered
in determining notoriety:
(1) the extent to which the crime is so heinous and shocking
that the circumstances of the crime command national media
attention;
(2) the status of the victim as a public figure;
(3) the status of the defendant as a public figure; and
(4) the extent to which the sordid or voyeuristic characteristics
of the crime are such as to Command national media attention.
II. In a case certified as one of national notoriety, but in which
the extent of publicity is significantly lower in an alternative judicial
district, a trial court in which a criminal case certified as one of
national publicity and notoriety shall:
(1) consider a defendant's request for a change of venue when:
(a) there exists a risk that the pretrial publicity in a case will
lead to a contamination of the potential jury pool by:
(i) widely disseminating material inculpatory evi-
dence that would be inadmissible in a court of law
and excluded from jury consideration, including but
not limited to inadmissible statements and confes-
sions or privileged information; or
(ii) widely disseminating opinions and commentaries
that are hostile toward the defendant, presume the
guilt of the defendant, stir passions against the
defendant, or create an inflammatory environment
hostile to the defendant; and
(2) Grant such a request for a change of venue to any alternative
judicial district where the extent and degree and publicity is
significantly less than in the forum court.
III. In all cases of national notoriety, the forum court shall:
(1) upon motion of the defendant, utilize the full extent of its
contempt powers to restrain all trial participants subject to the
court's contempt powers, including but not limited to parties,
counsel, and court personnel, from divulging any information
about the case to any unauthorized person, and in particular to
any agent or representative of the media. Said powers shall be
exercised to the full extent permitted by law and shall be limited
only by existing First Amendment constitutional restrictions upon
such use of the contempt power; and
(2) upon the motion of the defendant, close all court proceed-
ings to the public to ensure that no inculpatory evidence, which
would be inadmissible to jurors in a court of law, shall be
revealed to any person outside the court. Such judicial closure
at the request of the defendant shall be subject only to existing
constitutional First Amendment restrictions on such closures.
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IV. (1) Any motion made by a defendant under Section III shall
be heard immediately upon its filing with the court.
(2) A court shall make any orders that it deems necessary under
Section III to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial; it shall,
upon the request of the defendant, dissolve any such orders.
(3) A defendant's request for dissolution, or a failure by the
defendant to move for an order under Section III shall constitute
a constitutional waiver of the defendant's right to a fair trial
based upon a claim of unfair or prejudicial pretrial or trial
publicity.
(4) A defendant's request for an order under Section III may be
made at any time before or during the trial proceedings. A
defendant shall be deemed to have waived any claim of unfair or
prejudicial publicity for that period of time prior to the date of
filing of the motion under Section III.
Some may object that precise and detailed standards are not the
proper solution to constitutional questions. This was the position of
Miranda's critics, who objected that the Court's setting forth of such
detailed requirements for voluntariness constituted judicial legislation
of the worst sort, more appropriate for a police manual than for a
constitutional decision." 9 Yet the Court in Miranda recognized that
vague and subjective standards easily were sidestepped and avoided,
and resulted in inconsistent adjudications that provided little
predictive guidance to judges and police officers alike.410 Although
the application of the exclusionary rule as the exclusive sanction for
violations of the Fifth Amendment privilege has continued to be
controversial, it is clear that the specific standards set forth in Miranda
at least have provided the basis for stricter responses to constitutional
violations and a predictability not previously enjoyed. It is submitted
that this proposed standard would have the same effect on the
application of the right to a fair trial in cases of national notoriety.
The proposed standard takes into account the potential clash of a
defendant's Sixth and Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial, and the
First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech and the press.
Most important, however, the standard recognizes the realities of a
modem society in which there is instantaneous dissemination of
information by the mass media. When the First Amendment was
established, the notion that inculpatory evidence against an accused
409. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CH. L. REV. 435, 436
(1987); Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 678 (1992); George
C. Thomas III, An Assault on the Temple of Miranda, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 807, 824
(1995).
410. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449-54.
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in a local judicial proceeding might be transmitted instantaneously
across the country in a way that might create mass hysteria and
passion was beyond any comprehension.
The standard also recognizes that the law cannot permit pre-trial
publicity protected by the First Amendment to immunize a defendant
from all criminal liability. Because cases of national notoriety often
involve crimes of horrendous cruelty and barbarity, any claim that
pretrial publicity precludes all possibility of a fair trial, and therefore
any possibility of conviction and punishment, would undermine any
civilized notion of justice. To pose the question on a scale of
international justice: Would any civilized citizen or jurist of the world
community have contended at Nuremberg in 1945 that history's
greatest mass murderers should have gone free because of "prejudi-
cial" pre-trial publicity? Had Hitler been apprehended, would justice
have demanded that he not be prosecuted because his crimes were so
horrendous that they generated considerable media attention in the
form of distributed films of concentration camps and the like?
Fairness and justice long have been considered the cornerstones of
due process. n Certainly the law cannot hold that due process and
a fair trial can be provided only by violating the First Amendment.
It is true, therefore, that the proposed standard is an imperfect
constitutional solution. It rejects the kind of absolutism that would
make a mockery of the law and justice. It does, however, provide a
defendant with every tool and mechanism for a fair trial that a free
society can provide, consistent with a constitutional standard of free
speech and press.
There is ample precedent for such imperfect constitutional
solutions, even in the area of cherished constitutional liberties and
due process. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust,412 for example, the
Supreme Court was faced with an equally "insoluble" constitutional
dilemma.411 In that case, trustees petitioned a New York court to
approve a final settlement of a trust account 414 Although such a
settlement would affect the interests of a number of beneficiaries who
could not be located for purposes of service of process, the trustees
chose to proceed under the minimum requirements of New York law
by giving constructive notice through publication to unknown
411. See, e.g., Jessica N. Cohen, The Reasonable Doubt Jury Instruction: Giving Meaning to a
Critical Concept, 22 AM.J. CRIM. L. 677, 692 (1995); Lee Ann Dean, Due Process, 24 RUTGERS LJ.
1177, 1184 (1992); Danford H. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication, 66
YALE LJ. 319, 321 (1957).
412. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
413. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
414. See id. at 307.
1996]
THE AMERICAN UNVERSnIY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:39
beneficiaries in a local newspaper.415 In determining whether such
"constructive" notice complied with Due Process, the Court was asked
to reconcile two conflicting interests. On one hand, due process
appeared to require that actual notice be provided to those who
might lose their property as a result of the settlement proceeding.
416
On the other hand, the imposition of such a due process requirement
would bar New York from adjudicating title to property within its
jurisdiction in cases in which beneficiaries could not be located or
identified after the exercise of due diligence.417 Over time, the
Court believed, such a requirement would result in a large percentage
of property within the state being placed in "limbo" with no clear
title.
418
In Mullane, the Court adopted a constitutional compromise that
approved constructive notice in cases in which best efforts were made
and due diligence was exercised to identify and to personally serve
beneficiaries whose property interests would be affected. 419  It is
submitted that a similar constitutional compromise must be made in
criminal cases of national notoriety. Once a trial court has followed
certain standards designed to minimize the prejudicial effects of
pretrial publicity, due process must be deemed to be presumptively
satisfied,just as it was deemed presumptively satisfied in Mullanewhen
best efforts and due diligence were made to give actual notice to
those who faced deprivation of their property without an opportunity
to be heard.
As in Mullane, the proposed standard for cases of national notoriety
provides an imperfect constitutional solution. Adherence to the
proposed standard, however, would be far superior to current
practice.
415. See id. at 309.
416. See id. at 314 ("'The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the right to be
heard."' (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914))).
417. See id. at 313-14.
418. See id. at 317-18.
419. See id. at 319-20 (explaining that sending notice to last-known address constituted
minimum requirement of constructive notice and rejecting publication in local newspaper as
sufficient notice).
